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Forthcoming in The Cultural Matrix: Understanding Black Youth, ed. Orlando Patterson and Ethan Fosse (Harvard 
University Press). 	  Liberalism,	  Self-­‐Respect,	  and	  Troubling	  Cultural	  Patterns	  in	  Ghettos	  	   Tommie	  Shelby	  	  	  	   Scattered	  across	  the	  metropolitan	  landscape	  of	  the	  United	  States	  are	  many	  segregated	  black	  neighborhoods	  with	  high-­‐poverty	  rates	  (Wilson,	  1987;	  Massey	  and	  Denton,	  1993;	  Jargowsky,	  1997;	  Sharkey,	  2013).	  Social	  scientists,	  ordinary	  observers,	  and	  inhabitants	  of	  these	  spaces	  often	  refer	  to	  these	  stigmatized	  and	  deeply	  disadvantaged	  neighborhoods	  as	  “ghettos.”	  Ghetto	  neighborhoods,	  in	  addition	  to	  their	  concentrated	  poverty,	  typically	  have	  a	  number	  of	  troubling	  characteristics—alarming	  rates	  of	  violence,	  street	  crime,	  joblessness,	  teen	  pregnancy,	  family	  instability,	  school	  dropouts,	  welfare	  receipt,	  and	  illicit	  drug	  use.	  Exactly	  why	  ghettos	  persist	  is,	  to	  put	  it	  mildly,	  a	  complex	  and	  controversial	  question.	  But	  many,	  from	  all	  sides	  of	  the	  political	  spectrum,	  think	  that	  at	  least	  part	  of	  the	  explanation	  has	  to	  do	  with	  destructive	  or	  self-­‐defeating	  cultural	  patterns	  prevalent	  in	  ghettos.	  In	  fact,	  some	  believe	  there	  is	  a	  “culture	  of	  poverty,”	  or	  something	  similar,	  to	  be	  found	  in	  America’s	  ghettos.1	  The	  culture	  of	  poverty	  hypothesis	  holds	  that	  because	  the	  segregated	  black	  urban	  poor	  have	  lived	  for	  so	  long	  under	  such	  miserable	  conditions,	  many	  (though	  not	  all)	  who	  live	  in	  ghetto	  neighborhoods	  have	  developed	  attitudes,	  practices,	  and	  self-­‐concepts	  that	  inhibit	  their	  ability	  to	  improve	  their	  life	  prospects.	  Because	  of	  social	  distance	  or	  geographic	  isolation	  from	  mainstream	  institutions,	  these	  cultural	  traits	  are	  transmitted	  across	  generations	  and	  among	  peers	  in	  ghettos,	  so	  that	  many	  poor	  urban	  black	  
                                            1	  The	  idea	  that	  there	  exists	  a	  culture	  of	  poverty	  is	  old.	  One	  can	  even	  find	  a	  version	  of	  it	  articulated	  in	  W.	  E.	  B.	  Du	  Bois’s	  The	  Philadelphia	  Negro	  (1899),	  with	  its	  emphasis	  on	  the	  cultural	  deficits	  of	  newly	  urbanized	  blacks,	  especially	  the	  so-­‐called	  “submerged	  tenth.”	  The	  phrase	  “culture	  of	  poverty”	  came	  into	  popular	  use	  because	  of	  the	  influence	  of	  Oscar	  Lewis’s	  Five	  Families	  (1959),	  which	  focused	  on	  Mexican	  urban	  communities.	  The	  theory	  is	  developed	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  black	  urban	  poor	  in	  such	  well-­‐known	  texts	  as	  Michael	  Harrington’s	  The	  Other	  
America	  (1962),	  Kenneth	  Clark’s	  Dark	  Ghetto	  (1965),	  and	  Daniel	  Patrick	  Moynihan’s	  The	  Negro	  Family:	  The	  Case	  
for	  National	  Action	  (1965).	  2	  The	  substantive	  differences	  between	  the	  new	  cultural	  analysts	  and	  Oscar	  Lewis	  (the	  originator	  of	  the	  concept	  “culture	  of	  poverty”)	  may	  not	  be	  so	  stark.	  For	  a	  defense	  of	  the	  view	  that	  the	  classic	  culture	  of	  poverty	  theory,	  as	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children	  acquire	  them,	  often	  with	  catastrophic	  consequences.	  Indeed,	  some	  of	  these	  cultural	  currents	  are	  thought	  to	  contribute	  to	  perpetuating	  ghetto	  conditions	  and	  to	  have	  become	  formidable	  obstacles	  to	  ghetto	  residents	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  opportunities—say,	  in	  education	  and	  employment—that	  are	  available	  to	  them.	  In	  particular,	  some	  social	  bases	  of	  self-­‐esteem	  that	  exist	  in	  ghettos	  would	  appear	  to	  have	  engendered	  dysfunctional	  social	  identities	  that,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  long	  run,	  lead	  to	  further	  impoverishment.	  A	  number	  of	  social	  scientists	  that	  study	  urban	  poverty	  (including	  some	  in	  this	  volume)	  explicitly	  reject	  the	  culture	  of	  poverty	  hypothesis	  (e.g.,	  Roach	  and	  Gursslin,	  1967;	  Valentine,	  1968;	  Corcoran	  et	  al,	  1985;	  Wilson,	  1987;	  Jones	  and	  Luo,	  1999;	  Lamont	  and	  Small,	  2006).	  They	  do	  not	  believe	  there	  is	  a	  culture	  specific	  to	  poverty,	  for	  the	  cultural	  responses	  to	  poverty	  vary	  enormously	  across	  time	  and	  place	  and	  between	  immigrants	  and	  natives	  even	  in	  ghetto	  neighborhoods.	  Today,	  many	  who	  do	  scientific	  cultural	  analyses	  of	  the	  urban	  poor	  (call	  them	  the	  “new	  cultural	  analysts”)	  do	  not	  accept	  the	  idea	  that	  there	  is	  some	  totalizing	  or	  coherent	  subculture	  in	  poor	  black	  communities	  (Harding	  et	  al,	  2010).	  While	  acknowledging	  the	  existence	  of	  salient	  and	  distinctive	  cultural	  patterns	  in	  ghetto	  neighborhoods,	  they	  emphasize	  that	  there	  is	  tremendous	  cultural	  heterogeneity	  even	  within	  the	  same	  poor	  black	  neighborhood.	  And	  the	  cultural	  traits	  that	  are	  prevalent	  among	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  are	  not	  generally	  a	  straightjacket	  from	  which	  they	  cannot	  escape	  but	  more	  often	  a	  set	  of	  frames	  or	  repertoires	  that	  the	  black	  poor	  draw	  on	  (sometimes	  implicitly)	  to	  navigate	  their	  social	  environment	  and	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  their	  lives.	  Moreover,	  apart	  from	  these	  empirical	  and	  conceptual	  disagreements,	  the	  new	  cultural	  analysts	  reject	  the	  label	  “culture	  of	  poverty”	  because	  of	  its	  misleading	  associations	  and	  political	  baggage.	  They	  are	  particularly	  skeptical	  of	  those	  who	  use	  the	  culture	  of	  poverty	  idea	  to	  blame	  the	  black	  urban	  poor	  for	  their	  circumstances	  and	  to	  absolve	  government	  of	  any	  responsibility	  for	  alleviating	  the	  plight	  of	  the	  black	  poor.	  New	  cultural	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analysts	  often	  leave	  open	  the	  question	  of	  who	  is,	  ultimately,	  responsible	  for	  the	  disadvantages	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  face,	  and	  even	  when	  they	  do	  make	  claims	  about	  responsibility,	  their	  analyses	  are	  generally	  compatible	  with	  government	  having	  an	  obligation	  to	  improve	  the	  life	  prospects	  of	  the	  black	  urban	  poor.	  In	  addition,	  few	  believe	  that	  the	  cultural	  traits	  of	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  are	  the	  primary	  causal	  determinants	  of	  the	  persistence	  of	  ghettos	  or	  that	  these	  traits	  operate	  independently	  of	  structural	  factors.	  Lastly,	  new	  cultural	  analysts	  rarely	  invoke	  the	  language	  of	  “pathology”	  or	  “dysfunction”	  when	  describing	  the	  cultural	  patterns	  of	  the	  black	  poor.	  Indeed,	  some	  think	  that	  the	  cultural	  traits	  prevalent	  among	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  enable	  them	  to	  survive	  in	  their	  social	  environment.2	  Still,	  there	  are	  contemporary	  social	  scientists	  and	  certainly	  many	  in	  the	  broader	  public	  that	  believe	  cultural	  factors	  help	  to	  explain	  ghetto	  poverty,	  even	  if	  they	  insist	  that	  structural	  factors	  have	  equal	  or	  greater	  explanatory	  significance.	  Among	  those	  who	  think	  there	  are	  cultural	  aspects	  to	  ghetto	  poverty,	  some	  believe	  there	  are	  cultural	  traits	  associated	  with	  ghettos	  that	  hurt	  poor	  ghetto	  residents’	  chances	  of	  improving	  their	  lives	  through	  mainstream	  institutions	  and	  conventional	  paths	  of	  upward	  mobility.	  The	  issue,	  then,	  is	  not	  cultural	  divergence	  from	  convention	  per	  se.	  It	  is	  that	  such	  divergence	  leads	  to	  significantly	  reduced	  life	  prospects	  given	  the	  patterns	  of	  social	  organization	  typical	  of	  contemporary	  liberal-­‐capitalist	  societies.	  What	  those	  who	  take	  this	  position	  today	  have	  in	  common	  with	  some	  older	  culture	  of	  poverty	  theorists	  is	  the	  following	  belief:	  a	  significant	  
segment	  of	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  diverge	  culturally	  from	  mainstream	  values	  and	  norms	  and	  this	  
divergence	  generally	  inhibits	  their	  upward	  mobility	  or	  escape	  from	  poverty.	  I	  will	  call	  this	  the	  “suboptimal	  cultural	  divergence	  hypothesis”	  (or	  “cultural	  divergence	  thesis”	  for	  short).	  
                                            2	  The	  substantive	  differences	  between	  the	  new	  cultural	  analysts	  and	  Oscar	  Lewis	  (the	  originator	  of	  the	  concept	  “culture	  of	  poverty”)	  may	  not	  be	  so	  stark.	  For	  a	  defense	  of	  the	  view	  that	  the	  classic	  culture	  of	  poverty	  theory,	  as	  articulated	  by	  Lewis,	  has	  been	  subject	  to	  gross	  distortion	  and	  misrepresentation,	  by	  those	  on	  the	  left	  and	  the	  right,	  see	  Harvey	  and	  Reed,	  1996.	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Many	  social	  scientists	  are	  careful	  not	  to	  make,	  or	  even	  to	  imply,	  value	  judgments	  about	  the	  subjects	  they	  study.	  In	  their	  role	  as	  empirical	  researchers,	  they	  do	  not	  presume	  to	  tell	  the	  poor	  (or	  anyone	  else)	  how	  they	  ought	  to	  live	  or	  what	  they	  should	  value.	  Though	  perhaps	  personally	  motivated	  by	  a	  desire	  to	  reduce	  poverty	  or	  even	  by	  egalitarian	  concerns,	  in	  their	  vocation	  as	  scientists	  many	  take	  themselves	  to	  be	  providing	  empirical	  analyses	  of	  ghetto	  poverty	  that	  show	  the	  relationship	  between	  cultural	  processes	  and	  structural	  factors.	  There	  are	  of	  course	  some	  social	  scientists,	  particularly	  those	  that	  make	  policy	  recommendations,	  who	  are	  not	  reluctant	  to	  make	  value	  claims	  or	  to	  rely	  on	  what	  they	  take	  to	  be	  widely	  held	  and	  sound	  normative	  judgments.	  But	  even	  here,	  the	  normative	  claims	  are	  rarely	  defended	  and	  sometimes	  are	  not	  stated	  but	  only	  implied.	  Or	  the	  inferential	  links	  between	  analytical	  claims,	  empirical	  conclusions,	  normative	  assumptions,	  and	  policy	  prescriptions	  are	  not	  explicitly	  or	  carefully	  articulated.	  For	  purposes	  of	  this	  chapter,	  I	  will	  assume	  the	  cultural	  divergence	  thesis	  is	  basically	  sound.	  I	  don’t	  claim	  to	  know	  that	  the	  thesis	  is	  true	  and	  offer	  no	  defense	  of	  it.	  But	  I	  believe	  it	  is	  a	  plausible,	  widely	  held,	  and	  empirically	  grounded	  hypothesis	  worth	  taking	  seriously	  and	  seek	  to	  evaluate	  some	  practical	  prescriptions	  premised	  on	  it.	  My	  principal	  concern	  will	  be	  with	  what	  should,	  and	  what	  should	  not,	  be	  done	  if	  the	  thesis	  is	  true.	  Specifically,	  I	  will	  draw	  out	  and	  reflect	  on	  the	  normative	  implications	  of	  one	  possible	  practical	  response	  to	  suboptimal	  cultural	  divergence	  among	  the	  ghetto	  poor.	  This	  response,	  which	  I	  will	  call	  “cultural	  reform,”	  is	  to	  intervene	  in	  the	  lives	  of	  poor	  ghetto	  residents	  to	  shift	  their	  cultural	  orientation	  away	  from	  these	  suboptimal	  traits	  toward	  ones	  that	  will	  aid	  their	  exit	  from	  poverty.	  To	  many	  who	  care	  about	  the	  plight	  of	  the	  ghetto	  poor,	  the	  need	  for	  cultural	  reform	  may	  seem	  obvious.	  However,	  as	  I	  will	  argue,	  many	  kinds	  of	  cultural	  reform	  cannot	  be	  adequately	  justified	  to	  the	  ghetto	  poor,	  particularly	  those	  forms	  that	  entail	  government	  involvement	  in	  the	  reform	  effort.	  	  The	  focus	  of	  this	  chapter	  will	  be	  on	  the	  practical	  limits,	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moral	  permissibility,	  and	  overall	  wisdom	  of	  state-­‐sponsored	  cultural	  reform.	  I’m	  particularly	  concerned	  with	  its	  compatibility	  with	  liberal-­‐egalitarian	  values.	  I	  begin	  by	  further	  clarifying	  what	  I	  take	  the	  cultural	  divergence	  thesis	  to	  entail	  and	  what	  cultural	  reform	  might	  involve.	  	  1.	  The	  Suboptimal	  Cultural	  Divergence	  Hypothesis	  While	  middle-­‐	  and	  working-­‐class	  blacks	  often	  live	  in	  or	  adjacent	  to	  ghettos	  and	  may	  exhibit	  suboptimal	  cultural	  patterns,	  I	  will	  focus	  my	  attention	  on	  the	  black	  poor	  who	  have	  resided	  in	  ghettos	  for	  significant	  periods	  of	  time.	  I’ll	  refer	  to	  this	  group	  as	  “the	  ghetto	  poor.”	  Non-­‐poor	  blacks	  are	  often	  exposed	  to	  cultural	  dynamics	  in	  ghettos	  (Pattillo-­‐McCoy,	  1999),	  and	  some	  of	  what	  I	  will	  go	  on	  to	  say	  will	  be	  pertinent	  to	  them.	  But	  the	  plight	  of	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  is	  so	  dire	  and	  morally	  urgent	  that	  many	  believe	  it	  is	  permissible	  (if	  not	  obligatory)	  to	  intervene	  in	  their	  lives	  in	  ways	  that	  would	  not	  be	  justified	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  non-­‐poor.	  	   The	  category	  “ghetto	  poor”	  is	  defined	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  structural	  location	  within	  U.S.	  society.	  Specifically,	  membership	  is	  constituted	  by	  a	  person’s	  racial	  classification	  (black),	  class	  position	  (poor),	  and	  residential	  neighborhood	  (ghetto).	  The	  group	  is	  not	  defined	  by	  shared	  cultural	  characteristics	  (real	  or	  imagined).	  The	  term	  “ghetto	  poor”	  is	  not	  meant	  as	  a	  (more	  palatable)	  synonym	  for	  “underclass,”	  which	  is	  sometimes	  defined	  partly	  in	  terms	  of	  behavioral	  or	  cultural	  traits.	  And	  there	  is	  no	  suggestion	  that	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  represent	  a	  cohesive	  cultural	  group	  or	  share	  a	  unique	  subculture.	  Moreover,	  the	  version	  of	  the	  cultural	  divergence	  thesis	  that	  I	  will	  consider	  does	  not	  assert	  that	  it	  is	  a	  characteristic	  feature	  of	  poor	  black	  people	  in	  ghettos	  that	  they	  possesses	  a	  set	  of	  debilitating	  cultural	  traits.	  It	  is	  now	  widely	  acknowledged	  among	  cultural	  analysts	  that	  there	  is	  considerable	  cultural	  diversity	  among	  the	  poor	  in	  these	  neighborhoods.	  It	  cannot	  be	  said	  that	  all	  or	  even	  most	  of	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  are	  in	  the	  grip	  of	  a	  self-­‐defeating	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culture,	  since	  many	  can	  be	  characterized	  as	  having	  resisted	  its	  pull	  and	  many	  hold	  to	  mainstream	  beliefs	  and	  values	  (Newman,	  1999;	  Anderson,	  1999;	  Edin	  and	  Kefalas,	  2005;	  Young,	  2006;	  Smith,	  2007).	  Even	  those	  among	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  who	  do	  diverge	  from	  the	  cultural	  mainstream	  are	  not	  a	  culturally	  homogeneous	  group,	  as	  they	  often	  diverge	  in	  different	  ways	  and	  to	  different	  extents.	  However,	  one	  can	  agree	  that	  many	  (perhaps	  most)	  poor	  blacks	  in	  ghettos	  hold	  mainstream	  beliefs	  and	  values	  and	  yet	  maintain	  that	  an	  alarming	  number	  do	  not	  and	  that,	  moreover,	  this	  divergence	  from	  the	  mainstream	  negatively	  impacts	  their	  life	  prospects	  (Vaisey,	  2010).	  One	  might	  also	  worry	  that	  while	  some	  among	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  have	  so	  far	  evaded	  the	  grasp	  of	  these	  suboptimal	  cultural	  patterns,	  they	  are	  especially	  vulnerable	  to	  succumbing	  to	  the	  negative	  influence	  of	  these	  patterns;	  and	  perhaps	  all	  black	  youth	  residing	  in	  or	  near	  ghettos,	  whatever	  their	  class	  background,	  are	  vulnerable	  to	  being	  ensnared.	  Thus	  although,	  strictly	  speaking,	  not	  all	  poor	  black	  residents	  of	  ghettos	  are	  currently	  in	  need	  of	  cultural	  reform,	  they	  might	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  “high-­‐risk”	  group	  that	  cultural	  reformers	  may	  seek	  to	  target.	  In	  the	  version	  of	  the	  cultural	  divergence	  thesis	  that	  I	  want	  to	  discuss,	  some	  of	  the	  attitudes	  and	  practices	  among	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  are	  viewed	  as	  cultural	  adaptations	  or	  strategic	  responses	  to	  severely	  disadvantaged	  conditions.3 They	  are	  learned	  adjustments	  to	  socioeconomic	  hardship	  and	  social	  exclusion.	  Weak	  and	  strong	  versions	  of	  this	  claim	  have	  been	  defended.	  In	  the	  weak	  version,	  some	  poor	  denizens	  of	  ghettos	  may	  have	  developed	  
                                            3	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  there	  are	  advocates	  of	  the	  suboptimal	  cultural	  divergence	  thesis	  who	  do	  not	  believe	  that	  this	  subculture	  is,	  or	  ever	  was,	  an	  adaptation	  to	  poverty,	  slavery,	  or	  to	  unjust	  conditions.	  For	  example,	  Thomas	  Sowell	  (2005)	  has	  argued	  that	  black	  ghetto	  culture	  is	  actually	  the	  remnants	  of	  Southern	  white	  “redneck”	  culture,	  which	  has	  its	  origins	  in	  those	  regions	  of	  the	  British	  Isles	  from	  which	  white	  American	  Southerners	  came.	  The	  cultural	  traits	  that	  Sowell	  attributes	  to	  blacks	  in	  the	  ghetto	  (and	  to	  poor	  rural	  whites)	  are	  much	  the	  same	  as	  those	  cultural	  of	  poverty	  theorists	  attribute	  to	  poor	  blacks.	  Charles	  Murray	  (1984),	  by	  contrast,	  has	  argued	  that	  a	  culture	  of	  poverty,	  both	  in	  black	  ghettos	  and	  white	  slums,	  arose	  as	  a	  response	  to	  liberal	  welfare	  policies	  that	  encouraged	  the	  poor	  to	  depend	  on	  federal	  aid	  rather	  than	  strive	  to	  be	  economically	  self-­‐sufficient.	  These	  antipoverty	  policies,	  he	  claims,	  created	  perverse	  incentives	  that	  led	  to	  a	  dramatic	  rise	  in	  non-­‐marital	  births,	  family	  breakdown,	  crime,	  and	  other	  social	  ills.	  I	  will	  not	  discuss	  these	  variants	  of	  the	  cultural	  divergence	  thesis,	  but	  much	  of	  what	  I	  will	  go	  on	  to	  say	  will,	  I	  believe,	  hold	  true	  even	  if	  one	  of	  these	  variants	  is	  correct.	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ghetto-­‐specific	  cultural	  traits	  but	  would	  give	  them	  up	  if	  they	  believed	  they	  had	  real	  opportunities	  to	  succeed	  in	  mainstream	  society.	  For	  such	  persons,	  these	  cultural	  traits	  are	  (more	  or	  less)	  consciously	  adopted	  strategic	  responses	  to	  a	  perceived	  lack	  of	  opportunity.	  For	  instance,	  William	  Julius	  Wilson	  (1996:	  63-­‐64)	  notes	  that	  it	  might	  be	  rational	  to	  observe	  ghetto	  norms	  to	  get	  by	  on	  the	  mean	  streets	  of	  urban	  America	  but	  that	  these	  norms	  are	  not	  conducive	  to	  success	  in	  the	  wider	  society	  (also	  see	  Wilson,	  2009).	  He	  insists	  that	  if	  poor	  black	  men	  and	  women	  were	  provided	  the	  job	  training	  and	  employment	  that	  would	  enable	  upward	  mobility,	  most	  would	  choose	  to	  abandon	  ghetto-­‐specific	  cultural	  traits.	  If	  the	  weak	  version	  of	  the	  cultural	  divergence	  thesis	  is	  correct,	  cultural	  reform	  might	  nevertheless	  seem	  apt.	  Though	  there	  may	  be	  some	  who	  would	  be	  willing	  to	  abandon	  ghetto-­‐specific	  cultural	  traits	  if	  provided	  adequate	  opportunities	  in	  mainstream	  society,	  they	  may	  find	  it	  very	  difficult	  to	  fully	  leave	  behind	  their	  suboptimal	  cultural	  traits	  without	  outside	  intervention.	  Cultural	  traits	  can	  become	  pre-­‐conscious	  habits	  or	  implicit	  frames	  (“second	  nature,”	  as	  we	  say),	  which	  agents	  find	  difficult	  to	  detect	  in	  themselves	  or	  to	  break	  (e.g.,	  certain	  speech	  patterns,	  worldviews,	  or	  modes	  of	  bodily	  comportment).	  Even	  if	  they	  can	  shed	  their	  suboptimal	  cultural	  traits	  on	  their	  own,	  some	  may	  need	  help	  acquiring	  the	  needed	  mainstream	  traits—the	  relevant	  cultural	  competence—that	  would	  facilitate	  their	  upward	  mobility.	  Moreover,	  it	  may	  not	  be	  feasible	  to	  create	  a	  fair	  opportunity	  structure	  or	  an	  equitable	  distribution	  of	  resources	  any	  time	  soon.	  In	  the	  meantime,	  some	  might	  be	  able	  to	  escape	  poverty	  if	  they	  successfully	  underwent	  cultural	  reform,	  which	  would	  enable	  them	  to	  take	  better	  advantage	  of	  the	  meager	  opportunities	  currently	  available.	  According	  to	  the	  strong	  version,	  the	  relevant	  divergent	  cultural	  patterns	  may	  have	  started	  out	  as	  mere	  adaptive	  strategies	  for	  survival	  under	  hardship,	  but	  some	  have	  now	  come	  to	  accept	  these	  traits	  as	  legitimate	  culture.	  In	  effect,	  the	  suboptimal	  cultural	  traits	  are	  sometimes	  taken	  on	  as	  a	  positive	  identity.	  The	  cultural	  characteristics	  in	  question	  “have	  a	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life	  of	  their	  own,”	  that	  is,	  they	  are	  self-­‐perpetuating	  and,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  outside	  intervention,	  will	  likely	  remain	  stable	  (at	  least	  for	  some	  time)	  even	  in	  the	  face	  of	  growth	  in	  educational	  and	  employment	  opportunity,	  redistributive	  policies,	  and	  effective	  anti-­‐discrimination	  law.	  It	  is	  of	  course	  possible	  that,	  just	  as	  there	  are	  many	  among	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  who	  do	  not	  diverge	  significantly	  from	  the	  cultural	  mainstream,	  there	  are	  some	  from	  this	  group	  to	  whom	  the	  weak	  divergence	  thesis	  applies	  and	  some	  to	  whom	  the	  strong	  version	  does.	  If	  we	  treat	  the	  strong	  and	  weak	  versions	  of	  the	  cultural	  divergence	  thesis	  as	  claims	  about	  a	  significant	  portion	  of	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  rather	  than	  claims	  about	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  in	  general,	  as	  I	  will	  here,	  then	  there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  view	  the	  two	  versions	  of	  the	  thesis	  as	  incompatible.	  Moreover,	  I	  make	  no	  claims	  about	  what	  percentage	  of	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  fall	  into	  the	  mainstream,	  weak	  divergence,	  or	  strong	  divergence	  categories,	  assuming	  only	  that	  a	  non-­‐negligible	  number	  fall	  into	  each.	  	  2.	  Which	  Cultural	  Traits	  Are	  We	  Talking	  About?	  There	  is	  much	  disagreement	  about	  which	  cultural	  patterns	  prevalent	  in	  ghettos	  are	  suboptimal	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  the	  ghetto	  poor’s	  socioeconomic	  prospects.	  	  However,	  relying	  on	  the	  work	  of	  influential	  proponents	  of	  the	  cultural	  divergence	  thesis	  (Harrington,	  1997;	  Clark,	  1965;	  Moynihan,	  1967;	  Rainwater,	  1970;	  Fordham	  and	  Ogbu,	  1986;	  Sullivan,	  1989;	  Majors	  and	  Billson,	  1992;	  Anderson,	  1999;	  Patterson,	  2000;	  McWhorter,	  2006;	  Patterson,	  2006;	  Sánchez-­‐Jankowski,	  2008),	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  draw	  up	  a	  list	  of	  candidates.	  Some	  cultural	  analyses	  suggest	  that	  some	  among	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  have	  a	  value-­‐orientation	  that	  is	  in	  opposition	  to	  or	  incompatible	  with	  many	  conventional	  measures	  of	  success	  or	  that	  disdains	  what	  they	  perceive	  as	  “white”	  paths	  to	  success.	  So,	  for	  example,	  some	  among	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  are	  said	  to	  lack	  conventional	  occupational	  ambition	  or	  to	  reject	  the	  American	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work	  ethic	  in	  favor	  of	  excessive	  idleness.	  Some	  cultural	  analysts	  insist	  that	  there	  are	  many	  among	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  who	  have	  hostility	  or	  skepticism	  toward	  formal	  education	  (though	  perhaps	  “street	  wisdom,”	  autodidacticism,	  or	  folk	  knowledge	  is	  valued	  instead).	  There	  is	  said	  to	  be	  pessimism,	  even	  fatalism,	  about	  the	  prospects	  for	  upward	  mobility	  through	  mainstream	  channels.	  Some	  in	  ghetto	  communities	  are	  believed	  to	  devalue	  traditional	  co-­‐parenting	  and	  to	  eschew	  mainstream	  styles	  of	  childrearing.	  Many	  of	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  are	  thought	  to	  distrust	  established	  authority,	  particularly	  officials	  of	  the	  criminal	  justice	  system	  but	  also	  clergy	  and	  educators;	  and	  this	  attitude	  is	  often	  accompanied	  by	  a	  belief	  that	  such	  authority	  is	  corrupt	  and	  so	  unworthy	  of	  respect.	  The	  ghetto	  poor,	  particularly	  poor	  black	  youth,	  are	  sometimes	  portrayed	  as	  regarding	  the	  use	  of	  vulgar	  language	  (e.g.,	  “nigger”	  and	  “bitch”)	  and	  street	  vernacular	  as	  appropriate	  in	  contexts	  where	  such	  modes	  of	  expression	  are	  widely	  viewed	  as	  uncivil	  and	  offensive.	  In	  terms	  of	  what	  is	  accepted	  and	  sometimes	  valued,	  many	  among	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  are	  said	  to	  have	  a	  hedonistic	  orientation	  toward	  intense	  and	  immediate	  pleasure—e.g.,	  through	  frequent	  casual	  sex,	  gambling,	  drinking,	  fighting,	  and	  recreational	  drug	  use—joined	  with	  a	  refusal	  to	  delay	  such	  gratification	  and	  a	  high	  tolerance	  for	  risk.	  Many,	  especially	  black	  boys	  and	  young	  men,	  are	  thought	  to	  regard	  promiscuity	  and	  sexual	  infidelity	  as	  morally	  acceptable,	  and	  they	  attach	  little	  or	  no	  stigma	  to	  teenage	  pregnancy,	  non-­‐marital	  childbearing,	  paternal	  desertion,	  or	  single-­‐mother	  households.	  Many	  are	  said	  to	  be	  oriented	  toward	  crude	  materialism	  and	  leisure	  and	  to	  seek	  personal	  prestige	  through	  the	  conspicuous	  consumption	  of	  luxury	  items	  and	  high-­‐status	  brands.	  Street	  crime	  and	  interpersonal	  aggression	  are	  tolerated	  and	  sometimes	  embraced,	  including	  a	  readiness	  to	  use	  deception,	  manipulation,	  and	  even	  violence	  to	  achieve	  one’s	  aims.	  Not	  all	  of	  the	  values	  allegedly	  suboptimal	  for	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  contrast	  sharply	  with	  the	  mainstream.	  The	  relevant	  cultural	  divergence	  may	  not	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  the	  values	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themselves	  but	  the	  way	  they	  are	  held	  (e.g.,	  tenaciously	  or	  weakly);	  the	  priority	  they	  are	  given	  in	  practice;	  the	  way	  they	  are	  interpreted;	  or	  the	  context	  within	  which	  they	  tend	  to	  be	  expressed	  and	  acted	  on	  (e.g.,	  at	  work	  and	  school	  rather	  than	  at	  home	  and	  in	  recreational	  spaces).	  For	  example,	  patriarchal	  conceptions	  of	  masculinity,	  anti-­‐intellectualism,	  and	  materialism	  are	  widespread	  in	  American	  society,	  cutting	  across	  lines	  of	  race,	  class,	  and	  place.	  But	  some	  among	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  are	  believed	  to	  enact	  these	  values	  and	  norms	  in	  extreme	  ways,	  to	  give	  these	  values	  and	  norms	  much	  greater	  precedence	  in	  their	  lives	  than	  the	  average	  American,	  to	  interpret	  them	  in	  non-­‐standard	  ways,	  or	  to	  invoke	  them	  in	  inappropriate	  contexts.	  In	  such	  cases,	  the	  divergence	  from	  the	  mainstream	  is	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  the	  content	  of	  the	  values	  and	  norms	  but	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  they	  are	  adopted	  and	  understood	  and	  their	  role	  in	  practical	  deliberation.	  Recall	  that	  according	  to	  the	  weak	  version	  of	  the	  cultural	  divergence	  thesis,	  these	  cultural	  traits	  are	  components	  of	  a	  repertoire	  or	  part	  of	  a	  conceptual	  frame	  that	  agents	  strategically	  deploy	  to	  advance	  specific	  purposes	  in	  particular	  contexts.	  On	  the	  strong	  version,	  the	  traits	  in	  question	  represent	  fundamental	  commitments	  and	  may	  form	  part	  of	  the	  agent’s	  social	  identity.	  We	  can	  regard	  a	  person’s	  ghetto-­‐oriented	  and	  suboptimal	  beliefs,	  values,	  and	  practices	  as	  constituting	  a	  ghetto	  identity	  if:	  (a)	  they	  figure	  prominently	  in	  the	  person’s	  positive	  self-­‐concept;	  (b)	  they	  are	  relatively	  stable	  across	  different	  social	  contexts	  (i.e.,	  there	  is	  little	  or	  no	  situational	  code	  switching);	  and	  (c)	  the	  agent	  is	  resistant	  to	  changing	  them	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  principle.	  Thus,	  on	  the	  strong	  view,	  even	  given	  a	  chance	  to	  attend	  (or	  send	  their	  children	  to)	  a	  high-­‐quality	  and	  racially	  integrated	  school,	  to	  obtain	  a	  well-­‐paid	  non-­‐menial	  job,	  or	  to	  move	  to	  a	  low-­‐poverty	  and	  racially	  integrated	  neighborhood,	  many	  ghetto	  residents	  would	  still	  cling	  to	  their	  “ghetto”	  identities.	  Some	  cultural	  practices	  prominent	  in	  American	  ghettos	  have	  symbolic	  and	  expressive	  dimensions—e.g.,	  music,	  visual	  art,	  dance,	  humor,	  creative	  linguistic	  practices,	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and	  clothing	  and	  hair	  styles—that	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  or	  explained	  by	  ghetto	  poverty	  (Lott,	  1992;	  Rose,	  1994;	  Kelley,	  1997;	  Perry,	  2004;	  Rose,	  2008).	  These	  expressive	  and	  aesthetic	  traits	  draw	  on	  and	  extend	  black	  cultural	  traditions	  that	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  for	  generations	  prior	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  modern	  ghetto,	  and	  blacks	  who	  have	  never	  lived	  in	  a	  ghetto	  or	  even	  been	  poor	  value	  and	  participate	  in	  them,	  along	  with	  many	  who	  are	  neither	  black	  nor	  poor.	  In	  addition,	  some	  dimensions	  of	  ghetto	  cultural	  life,	  while	  perhaps	  in	  some	  sense	  a	  collective	  response	  to	  ghetto	  conditions,	  have	  political	  meaning	  or	  intent	  and	  so	  are	  not	  simply	  a	  matter	  of	  coping	  with,	  adapting	  to,	  or	  surviving	  the	  conditions	  of	  poverty.	  Some	  rap	  music,	  for	  instance,	  offers	  social	  critiques	  of	  ghetto	  conditions	  and	  expresses	  a	  spirit	  of	  resistance	  to	  the	  structures	  and	  dynamics	  that	  reproduce	  these	  horrendous	  circumstances	  (Rose,	  1994;	  Shelby,	  forthcoming).	  Those	  who	  advance	  the	  cultural	  divergence	  thesis	  need	  not	  deny	  that	  the	  cultural	  traits	  of	  ghetto	  denizens	  include	  such	  expressive,	  aesthetic,	  or	  political	  elements,	  but	  some	  may	  regard	  them	  as	  suboptimal	  insofar	  as	  they	  inhibit	  upward	  mobility	  among	  the	  black	  poor	  or	  spatial	  mobility	  out	  of	  the	  ghetto.	  Consequently,	  some	  cultural	  reformers	  may	  seek	  to	  limit	  their	  influence	  on	  the	  ghetto	  poor,	  particularly	  on	  black	  children.	  Certain	  strands	  of	  hip-­‐hop	  culture	  are	  often	  targets	  of	  cultural	  reform.	  Proponents	  of	  the	  cultural	  divergence	  thesis	  do	  not	  generally	  equate	  “ghetto	  identity”	  with	  “black	  identity.”	  	  To	  be	  sure,	  it	  is	  said	  that	  poor	  urban	  blacks	  developed	  and	  value	  these	  cultural	  traits	  and	  that	  the	  relevant	  traits	  draw	  on,	  or	  have	  an	  affinity	  with,	  familiar	  black	  traditions	  and	  folkways.	  Nevertheless,	  it	  is	  often	  claimed	  that	  those	  who	  have	  a	  ghetto	  identity	  define	  themselves,	  not	  only	  in	  opposition	  to	  mainstream	  American	  culture,	  but	  often	  in	  opposition	  to	  self-­‐concepts	  associated	  with	  blacks	  who	  are	  successful	  by	  conventional	  measures	  or	  who	  attained	  their	  success	  through	  mainstream	  avenues.	  Insofar	  as	  a	  ghetto	  identity	  is	  regarded	  as	  “black,”	  it	  should	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  subspecies	  or	  mode	  of	  blackness	  that	  many	  who	  identify	  as	  black	  reject.	  Within	  black	  vernacular,	  blacks	  readily	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distinguish	  between	  “ghetto	  blacks,”	  “working-­‐class	  blacks,”	  and	  “bougie	  blacks,”	  and	  these	  designations	  (which	  are	  sometimes	  used	  as	  epithets)	  are	  meant	  to	  track	  race,	  class,	  place	  
and	  culture	  (Miller,	  2008;	  Farhi,	  2007).	  Moreover,	  many	  black	  Americans	  who	  think	  of	  themselves	  as	  having	  a	  strong	  black	  cultural	  identity	  accept	  (and	  perhaps	  lament)	  the	  cultural	  divergence	  thesis.	  For	  instance,	  in	  a	  recent	  PEW	  Forum	  survey	  (2007),	  in	  response	  to	  the	  question	  “Have	  the	  values	  of	  middle	  class	  and	  poor	  blacks	  become	  more	  similar	  or	  more	  different?”	  61	  percent	  of	  blacks	  answered	  “more	  different.”	  Indeed,	  many	  actively	  participate	  in	  cultural	  reform	  efforts	  as	  part	  of	  a	  program	  of	  racial	  uplift.4	  	  3.	  Cultural	  Reform	  Confronted	  with	  compelling	  evidence	  in	  support	  of	  the	  cultural	  divergence	  hypothesis,	  some	  might	  acknowledge	  that	  cultural	  change	  in	  ghetto	  neighborhoods	  is	  needed	  but	  recoil	  from	  the	  idea	  that	  government	  should	  play	  an	  active	  role	  in	  bringing	  about	  such	  changes—that	  is,	  apart	  from	  making	  necessary	  structural	  changes	  in	  the	  laws	  and	  institutions	  that	  negatively	  affect	  the	  lives	  of	  the	  urban	  poor.	  The	  approach	  I	  want	  to	  consider	  would	  be	  less	  reticent	  about	  getting	  the	  government	  involved	  in	  effecting	  cultural	  changes	  in	  the	  lives	  of	  the	  ghetto	  poor.	  Indeed,	  it	  might	  be	  thought	  that	  such	  state	  intervention	  is	  essential	  if	  ghetto	  poverty	  and	  its	  associated	  social	  ills	  are	  to	  be	  adequately	  addressed.	  	   Cultural	  reform	  should	  be	  distinguished	  from	  mere	  behavior	  modification.	  The	  state	  might	  try	  to	  change	  the	  behavior	  of	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  without	  attempting	  to	  change	  their	  cultural	  traits,	  regarding	  any	  cultural	  changes	  that	  do	  occur	  as	  unintended	  byproducts	  or	  side	  effects	  of	  intended	  behavioral	  changes.	  For	  instance,	  the	  state	  might	  use	  incentives	  or	  penalties	  to	  induce	  behavior	  thought	  to	  be	  more	  conducive	  to	  upward	  mobility.	  If	  refusing	  to	  work	  or	  using	  illegal	  drugs	  is	  believed	  to	  contribute	  to	  poverty,	  then	  the	  government	  
                                            4	  For	  discussions	  and	  critiques	  of	  black	  elite	  advocacy	  of	  cultural	  reform,	  see	  Dyson,	  2005;	  Pattillo,	  2007:	  chap.	  2;	  Cohen,	  2010:	  chaps.	  2-­‐3.	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might	  step	  in	  to	  penalize	  such	  behavior	  with	  the	  hope	  that	  poor	  people	  will	  choose	  to	  work	  and	  abstain	  from	  illicit	  drug	  use.	  This	  would	  be	  behavior	  modification,	  not	  cultural	  reform.	  With	  behavior	  modification,	  there	  need	  not	  be	  a	  presumption	  that	  the	  undesirable	  behavior	  is	  part	  of	  a	  learned	  cultural	  pattern	  or	  cultural	  identity.	  The	  behavior	  may	  simply	  be,	  for	  instance,	  the	  result	  of	  individual	  (rational	  or	  irrational)	  decision-­‐making	  or	  habit.	  If	  there	  is	  a	  pattern	  of	  such	  behavior	  in	  a	  group,	  this	  may	  simply	  be	  a	  reflection	  of	  similar	  decision-­‐making	  or	  errors	  in	  practical	  reasoning	  among	  those	  in	  the	  group.	  By	  contrast,	  cultural	  reform	  is	  premised	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  relevant	  behavioral	  changes	  will	  only	  occur,	  or	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  occur,	  or	  will	  be	  more	  durable	  if	  some	  cultural	  traits	  are	  modified.	  Here	  there	  is	  a	  presumption	  that	  the	  suboptimal	  behavior	  in	  question	  is	  shaped	  or	  influenced	  by	  a	  set	  of	  cultural	  patterns.	  Thus	  the	  cultural	  reformer	  would	  harness	  the	  power	  and	  resources	  of	  the	  state	  to	  bring	  about	  the	  desired	  cultural	  changes.	  	   There	  are	  at	  least	  three	  types	  of	  cultural	  changes	  that	  might	  be	  sought,	  each	  with	  different	  normative	  implications.	  The	  first	  and	  least	  radical	  would	  be	  cultural	  augmentation.	  Here	  the	  cultural	  reformer	  seeks	  to	  add	  to	  the	  cultural	  repertoire	  of	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  without	  attempting	  to	  remove	  or	  alter	  any	  of	  their	  existing	  cultural	  traits.	  The	  idea	  would	  be	  to	  equip	  poor	  blacks	  with	  some	  mainstream	  cultural	  tools	  (sometimes	  called	  “cultural	  capital”),	  which	  they	  could	  then	  choose	  when	  and	  whether	  to	  use	  and	  what	  ends	  to	  put	  them	  to.	  Their	  prior	  cultural	  attachments,	  whatever	  they	  happen	  to	  be,	  would	  not	  then	  be	  threatened.	  The	  second	  and	  more	  radical	  change	  is	  cultural	  removal.	  This	  would	  involve	  eliminating	  or	  neutralizing	  any	  existing	  cultural	  traits	  believed	  to	  be	  suboptimal.	  This	  type	  of	  intervention	  would	  not	  however	  involve	  instilling	  new	  mainstream	  cultural	  traits.	  Cultural	  removal	  would	  work	  best	  if,	  as	  some	  cultural	  analysts	  insist,	  most	  among	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  already	  embrace	  mainstream	  cultural	  values	  and	  norms.	  Simply	  removing	  or	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defusing	  any	  suboptimal	  traits	  might	  then	  be	  sufficient	  to	  put	  them	  on	  a	  path	  out	  of	  poverty.	  The	  most	  radical	  approach	  to	  cultural	  reform	  would	  be	  cultural	  rehabilitation.	  It	  would	  combine	  cultural	  augmentation	  with	  cultural	  removal—getting	  rid	  of	  existing	  suboptimal	  traits	  and	  replacing	  them	  with	  mainstream	  cultural	  traits.	  Which	  types	  of	  cultural	  traits	  are	  targets	  for	  cultural	  reform?	  The	  particular	  traits	  identified	  for	  augmentation	  or	  removal	  will	  affect	  how	  controversial	  and	  potentially	  problematic	  the	  mode	  of	  cultural	  reform	  would	  be.	  Attempts	  to	  change	  shared	  beliefs	  among	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  would	  be	  the	  least	  controversial,	  provided	  the	  beliefs	  in	  question	  pertain	  to	  matters	  of	  fact	  (rather	  than	  to	  what	  is	  desirable	  or	  valuable)	  and	  provided	  the	  beliefs	  are	  not	  religious	  views.	  For	  example,	  if	  some	  among	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  share	  the	  belief	  that	  formal	  education	  will	  not	  improve	  their	  life	  prospects	  or	  that	  there	  are	  no	  decent	  jobs	  available	  to	  them,	  and	  if	  this	  belief	  is	  factually	  incorrect,	  then	  a	  cultural	  reformer	  might	  try	  to	  change	  this	  erroneous	  perception	  or	  to	  prevent	  its	  spread.	  The	  cultural	  reformer	  might	  also	  attempt	  to	  change	  the	  skill	  set	  of	  those	  targeted	  for	  reform.	  Some	  cultural	  analysts	  maintain	  that	  the	  cultural	  repertoire	  of	  poor	  blacks	  includes	  a	  set	  of	  social	  skills	  for	  operating	  in	  ghettos.	  But	  these	  ghetto-­‐specific	  skills	  may	  not	  be	  helpful	  in	  the	  wider	  world	  and,	  deployed	  in	  the	  wrong	  context,	  may	  hurt	  one’s	  chances	  of	  success	  in	  mainstream	  society.	  	  Effectively	  navigating	  the	  mainstream	  social	  world	  so	  as	  to	  improve	  one’s	  socioeconomic	  situation	  also	  involves	  the	  deft	  deployment	  of	  cultural	  skills.	  Insofar	  as	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  lack	  these	  skills,	  the	  cultural	  reformer	  might	  seek	  to	  impart	  them.	  This	  type	  of	  cultural	  augmentation	  is,	  at	  least	  in	  principle,	  unobjectionable.	  Once	  acquired,	  the	  agents	  can	  decide	  whether	  to	  make	  use	  of	  this	  practical	  know-­‐how	  and	  for	  what	  purposes,	  and	  they	  can	  continue	  to	  rely	  on	  their	  ghetto-­‐specific	  know-­‐how	  if	  they	  so	  choose.	  Cultural	  de-­‐skilling	  would	  be	  another	  matter.	  A	  person	  can	  lose	  an	  acquired	  skill	  if	  he	  or	  she	  does	  not	  use	  it	  enough.	  Either	  the	  ability	  degrades	  over	  time	  or	  one	  forgets	  how	  to	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deploy	  it	  properly.	  So	  de-­‐skilling	  may	  be	  possible	  if	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  were	  deprived	  of	  opportunities	  to	  use	  their	  ghetto-­‐specific	  skill	  set	  or	  were	  prevented	  from	  drawing	  on	  it.	  Unless	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  voluntarily	  went	  along	  with	  this,	  such	  a	  practice,	  given	  the	  constraints	  it	  would	  impose	  on	  them,	  would	  raise	  serious	  questions	  about	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  state’s	  interference	  with	  their	  liberty.	  Some	  customs—shaking	  hands,	  saying	  “thank	  you,”	  making	  eye	  contact,	  smiling,	  enunciating	  words—become	  habits.	  The	  cultural	  reformer	  may	  therefore	  seek	  to	  change	  some	  cultural	  habits,	  either	  instilling	  new	  habits	  or	  breaking	  old	  ones.	  	  Many	  customs	  are	  preconscious	  or	  second	  nature	  and	  performed	  almost	  involuntarily.	  Given	  how	  difficult	  it	  is	  to	  control	  or	  break	  a	  habit	  once	  it	  has	  formed,	  the	  cultural	  reform	  of	  habits	  could	  prove	  morally	  problematic.	  Even	  more	  controversial	  would	  be	  attempts	  to	  change	  the	  values	  or	  cultural	  
identities	  of	  the	  ghetto	  poor.	  Getting	  into	  this	  sensitive	  terrain	  might	  however	  seem	  unavoidable.	  Some	  of	  the	  relevant	  cultural	  traits	  that	  appear	  to	  be	  least	  optimal	  (if	  not	  destructive)—again,	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  escaping	  poverty—do	  not	  have	  to	  do	  with	  factual	  beliefs,	  cultural	  skills,	  or	  customary	  practices.	  They	  have	  to	  do	  with	  ideals	  and	  values,	  with	  what	  ends	  are	  desirable	  and	  worthwhile.	  What	  constitutes	  a	  “good	  job”?	  What	  constitutes	  “success”	  in	  life?	  What	  does	  it	  mean	  to	  be	  a	  “responsible	  parent”?	  Is	  it	  wrong	  to	  smoke	  marijuana	  or	  to	  use	  cocaine?	  Do	  police	  officers	  and	  laws	  deserve	  our	  respect?	  These	  and	  similar	  questions	  turn	  on	  matters	  of	  value.	  They	  are	  normative	  questions.	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  how	  cultural	  reform	  could	  be	  successful	  and	  yet	  avoid	  such	  questions	  entirely.	  Once	  we	  know	  what	  kind	  of	  cultural	  change	  is	  sought	  and	  which	  types	  of	  cultural	  traits	  are	  targeted	  for	  change,	  we	  still	  need	  to	  know	  which	  age	  groups	  should	  be	  targeted.	  Pre-­‐adolescent	  children	  are	  the	  most	  malleable,	  so	  they	  might	  seem	  like	  the	  best	  candidates.	  Even	  teenagers	  in	  early	  adolescence	  (ages	  10-­‐15)	  may	  seem	  promising	  if	  more	  challenging.	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Provided	  their	  parents	  are	  adequately	  informed	  about	  and	  consent	  to	  the	  programs,	  such	  initiatives	  are	  permissible,	  even	  if	  cultural	  reform	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  cultural	  rehabilitation.	  Though	  parental	  authority	  and	  family	  autonomy	  have	  their	  limits	  and	  can	  be	  overridden	  where	  there	  is	  child	  abuse,	  endangerment,	  or	  neglect,	  within	  these	  parameters	  they	  should	  be	  respected.	  If	  a	  parent	  wants	  to	  enroll	  his	  or	  her	  child	  into	  a	  program	  or	  school	  that	  engages	  in	  cultural	  reform,	  this	  would	  not	  be	  any	  worse	  than	  when	  parents	  send	  their	  kids	  to	  a	  religious	  or	  boarding	  school.	  Things	  get	  more	  complicated	  with	  late	  adolescents	  (ages	  16-­‐17)	  and	  young	  adults	  (ages	  18-­‐25).	  Given	  their	  cognitive,	  emotional,	  and	  moral	  development	  and	  the	  imperative	  to	  teach	  them	  to	  run	  their	  own	  lives,	  late	  adolescents,	  though	  not	  adults,	  are	  properly	  accorded	  autonomy	  over	  significant	  domains	  of	  their	  lives	  (Schapiro,	  1999).	  They	  are	  also	  expected	  to	  take	  full	  responsibility	  for	  many	  of	  the	  outcomes	  of	  their	  choices,	  even	  when	  these	  choices	  could	  adversely	  affect	  their	  futures.	  This	  is	  widely	  acknowledged,	  even	  by	  the	  U.S.	  government,	  as	  late	  adolescents	  are	  permitted	  to	  drop	  out	  of	  school,	  to	  accept	  employment,	  and	  to	  operate	  motor	  vehicles,	  and	  are	  sometimes	  subject	  to	  criminal	  prosecution	  as	  adults.	  Young	  adults	  (assuming	  no	  serious	  mental	  illness	  or	  debilitating	  cognitive	  disabilities)	  are	  rightly	  treated	  as	  fully	  competent	  to	  govern	  their	  lives,	  with	  all	  the	  rights	  and	  responsibilities	  this	  entails.5	  Thus,	  cultural	  reform	  directed	  at	  late	  adolescents	  and	  young	  adults	  is	  potentially	  more	  problematic	  than	  reform	  directed	  at	  young	  children.	  I	  will	  leave	  aside	  older	  adults,	  since	  they	  are	  unlikely	  to	  be	  viewed	  as	  good	  candidates	  for	  cultural	  reform.	  Before	  offering	  a	  more	  in-­‐depth	  treatment	  of	  the	  practicality	  and	  moral	  permissibility	  of	  cultural	  reform,	  I	  need	  to	  outline	  the	  particular	  methods	  and	  techniques	  the	  state	  might	  use	  or	  sponsor	  to	  bring	  about	  the	  relevant	  changes.	  The	  cultural	  
                                            5	  Despite	  having	  the	  right	  to	  vote	  and	  enlist	  into	  the	  military,	  18-­‐20	  year-­‐olds	  do	  not	  have	  the	  right	  to	  buy	  alcoholic	  beverages	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  I	  leave	  this	  controversial	  exception	  aside.	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augmentation	  of	  factual	  beliefs	  through	  the	  provision	  of	  information	  is	  the	  most	  benign.	  Few	  would	  object	  to	  this,	  provided	  it	  is	  based	  on	  sound	  scientific	  research	  and	  is	  devoid	  of	  the	  deception	  and	  manipulation	  characteristic	  of	  commercial	  advertising	  and	  political	  ads.	  Attempting	  to	  eliminate	  the	  false	  factual	  beliefs	  of	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  through	  information	  isn’t	  problematic	  either.	  Things	  get	  more	  complicated	  with	  instruction	  and	  training	  programs.	  Teaching	  involves	  the	  provision	  of	  information	  and	  dissemination	  of	  knowledge	  but	  generally	  goes	  well	  beyond	  this.	  It	  can	  entail	  skills	  training,	  inculcating	  desirable	  habits	  (or	  breaking	  undesirable	  ones),	  instilling	  values,	  and	  shaping	  identities.	  The	  relevant	  skills,	  habits,	  and	  values	  can	  perhaps	  sometimes	  be	  imparted	  through	  lectures,	  discussion,	  and	  the	  distribution	  of	  information.	  But	  sometimes	  a	  more	  directive	  and	  supervisory	  approach	  is	  the	  only	  effective	  method.	  Counseling	  could	  also	  be	  used	  as	  a	  cultural	  reform	  technique.	  Such	  counseling	  might	  be	  no	  more	  than	  advice	  and	  encouragement,	  and	  so	  almost	  as	  benign	  as	  the	  provision	  of	  information	  or	  the	  intervention	  of	  a	  friend.	  But	  the	  counseling	  could	  take	  a	  more	  explicitly	  therapeutic	  form,	  in	  which	  the	  client	  is	  expected	  to	  submit	  to	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  counselor.	  The	  counseling	  could	  also	  be	  faith-­‐based,	  in	  which	  non-­‐rational	  means	  of	  persuasion	  are	  used	  (e.g.,	  the	  exploitation	  of	  guilt	  or	  intimations	  of	  divine	  disapproval	  and	  sanctions).	  Would	  therapeutic	  or	  spiritual	  counseling	  be	  problematic	  as	  a	  technique	  of	  cultural	  reform?	  Much	  will	  depend	  on	  the	  power	  relationship	  between	  the	  counselor	  and	  the	  client	  and	  on	  whether	  the	  client	  has	  a	  choice	  in	  whether	  to	  seek	  the	  type	  of	  counseling	  in	  question.	  If	  poor	  blacks	  seek	  counseling	  because	  they	  believe	  they	  have	  suboptimal	  cultural	  traits	  and	  think	  counseling	  would	  help	  to	  change	  these,	  then	  there	  is	  little	  reason	  to	  object	  to	  the	  practice.	  Of	  course,	  if	  providing	  useful	  information,	  voluntary	  educational	  and	  training	  programs,	  and	  voluntary	  counseling	  services	  were	  all	  that	  were	  needed	  to	  bring	  about	  the	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relevant	  cultural	  changes,	  cultural	  reform	  would	  not	  raise	  such	  difficult	  moral	  questions.	  A	  more	  aggressive	  approach	  may	  appear	  necessary,	  however.	  The	  cultural	  traits	  targeted	  for	  change	  may	  be	  recalcitrant,	  and	  those	  individuals	  singled	  out	  for	  cultural	  change	  may	  not	  be	  disposed	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  relevant	  programs.	  Even	  those	  who	  do	  choose	  to	  participate	  may	  not	  continue	  with	  them	  long	  enough	  or	  may	  not	  fully	  cooperate	  with	  those	  running	  the	  programs.	  This	  naturally	  raises	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  permissibility	  of	  incentives	  and	  sanctions.	  Incentives,	  particularly	  financial	  ones,	  may	  seem	  benign.	  However,	  when	  they	  are	  offered	  to	  the	  poor,	  especially	  to	  those	  severely	  disadvantaged,	  they	  can	  be	  morally	  troubling.	  When	  one	  is	  socioeconomically	  disadvantaged	  and	  in	  need	  of	  basic	  resources,	  it	  can	  be	  very	  difficult	  to	  turn	  down	  a	  financial	  offer,	  especially	  if	  one	  has	  dependents	  in	  need	  of	  things	  you	  cannot	  provide.	  Thus,	  many	  among	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  might	  participate	  in	  cultural	  reform	  programs,	  not	  because	  they	  see	  their	  value	  and	  just	  need	  a	  little	  nudge,	  but	  because	  they	  desperately	  need	  socioeconomic	  resources.	  Depending	  on	  their	  alternatives,	  they	  may	  be	  effectively	  compelled	  to	  submit	  to	  cultural	  reform	  even	  if	  they	  regard	  it	  as	  demeaning	  or	  insulting.	  The	  imposition	  of	  sanctions	  or	  penalties	  raises	  the	  most	  serious	  worries.	  Not	  only	  might	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  object	  that	  they	  are	  being	  forced	  to	  submit	  to	  a	  demeaning	  cultural	  reform	  process;	  they	  might	  also	  object	  to	  any	  suffering,	  unpleasantness,	  indignities,	  or	  loss	  of	  liberty	  such	  penalties	  would	  involve.	  Pointing	  out	  that	  this	  is	  for	  their	  own	  good	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  an	  adequate	  response	  to	  these	  complaints.	  	  4.	  Moral	  Reform	  Relying	  on	  distinctions	  outlined	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  I	  will	  largely	  restrict	  myself	  to	  examining	  the	  normative	  and	  practical	  implications	  of	  one	  particular	  type	  of	  cultural	  reform,	  which	  I	  will	  designate	  “moral	  reform.”	  Moral	  reform	  goes	  beyond	  correcting	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mistaken	  cultural	  beliefs	  or	  expanding	  the	  cultural	  repertoire	  of	  the	  ghetto	  poor.	  It	  is	  a	  form	  of	  cultural	  rehabilitation	  that	  targets	  not	  only	  beliefs	  and	  skills	  but	  also	  habits,	  values,	  and	  identities.	  The	  public	  policy	  goal	  of	  moral	  reform	  is	  both	  to	  alter	  the	  cultural	  traits	  of	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  by	  severing	  or	  weakening	  their	  attachment	  to	  suboptimal	  cultural	  traits	  and	  to	  instill	  mainstream	  cultural	  traits	  in	  those	  who	  lack	  them	  or	  to	  strengthen	  their	  attachment	  to	  these	  traits	  when	  there	  is	  only	  a	  weak	  commitment	  to	  them.	  The	  relevant	  mainstream	  cultural	  traits	  include	  a	  value-­‐orientation	  toward	  and	  commitment	  to	  hard	  work,	  thrift,	  economic	  self-­‐sufficiency,	  delayed	  gratification,	  academic	  achievement,	  civility,	  respect	  for	  authority,	  moderation	  in	  drink	  and	  play,	  reverence	  for	  the	  institution	  of	  marriage,	  and	  responsible	  reproduction	  and	  good	  parenting.	  Though	  moral	  reform	  is	  sometimes	  directed	  toward	  young	  children,	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  moral	  reform	  directed	  at	  late	  adolescents	  and	  young	  adults	  (often	  designated	  as	  “youth”),	  as	  this	  raises	  the	  most	  interesting	  moral	  issues.	  Moral	  reform	  might	  be	  accomplished	  through	  a	  number	  of	  government	  directed	  or	  community-­‐based	  but	  publicly	  funded	  measures.	  The	  kinds	  of	  policies,	  programs,	  and	  techniques	  I	  have	  in	  mind	  include	  the	  following.6	  Moral	  reform	  could	  involve	  making	  work	  or	  job	  training	  a	  condition	  for	  receiving	  public	  aid	  with	  a	  view	  toward	  instilling	  an	  appropriate	  work	  ethic,	  labor-­‐force	  attachment,	  and	  the	  value	  of	  economic	  self-­‐sufficiency.	  Such	  a	  program	  could	  include	  empowering	  social	  workers	  with	  the	  authority	  to	  regulate	  the	  lives	  of	  those	  who	  rely	  on	  public	  assistance.	  For	  example,	  they	  might	  threaten	  to	  withhold	  or	  cancel	  benefits	  for	  those	  who	  refuse	  to	  adhere	  to	  work	  requirements.	  The	  government	  could	  criminalize	  “vices”	  associated	  with	  a	  suboptimal	  ghetto	  lifestyle	  (e.g.,	  drug	  use,	  gambling,	  and	  prostitution)	  or	  make	  the	  abandonment	  of	  such	  practices	  a	  condition	  for	  housing	  assistance	  or	  other	  aid.	  Programs	  could	  be	  established	  that	  exhort	  and	  counsel	  the	  
                                            6	  For	  defenses	  of	  such	  measures,	  see	  the	  essays	  in	  Mead,	  1997.	  Also	  see	  Kaus,	  1992.	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ghetto	  poor	  to	  make	  more	  responsible	  choices	  (e.g.,	  about	  reproduction,	  marriage,	  and	  parenting).	  Moral	  reform	  could	  involve	  moving	  poor	  people	  out	  of	  ghettos	  to	  low-­‐poverty	  neighborhoods	  with	  the	  expectation	  that	  they	  will	  come	  to	  absorb	  values	  and	  norms	  of	  conduct	  prevalent	  in	  these	  more	  advantaged	  communities.	  The	  ghetto	  poor	  might	  be	  given	  middle-­‐class	  mentors	  and	  role	  models	  so	  that	  they	  might	  come	  to	  assimilate	  mainstream	  norms	  and	  to	  develop	  cultural	  capital.	  The	  state	  might	  enable	  greater	  involvement	  of	  faith-­‐based	  institutions	  or	  clergy	  in	  the	  lives	  of	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  with	  the	  expectation	  that	  certain	  religious	  beliefs	  and	  values	  might	  take	  (stronger)	  root.7	  One	  important	  thing	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  about	  such	  programs	  and	  policies	  is	  that	  even	  when	  they	  take	  the	  form	  of	  incentives	  and	  sanctions	  the	  point	  of	  moral	  reform	  is	  not	  simply	  to	  modify	  behavior	  but	  to	  restructure	  the	  soul—to	  change	  fundamentally	  the	  values,	  character,	  and	  identity	  of	  those	  in	  the	  grip	  of	  what	  are	  regarded	  as	  debilitating	  cultural	  patterns.	  To	  use	  an	  expression	  coined	  by	  Anthony	  Appiah	  (2005:	  ch.	  5),	  moral	  reform	  would	  be	  a	  type	  of	  “soul	  making”	  that	  a	  state	  might	  engage	  in	  to	  help	  citizens	  lead	  more	  successful	  lives.	  The	  idea	  behind	  moral	  reform	  is	  that	  once	  the	  reform	  is	  complete,	  after	  the	  programs	  are	  over	  and	  the	  incentives	  and	  sanctions	  are	  no	  longer	  being	  applied,	  those	  who	  have	  undergone	  the	  reform	  process	  will	  now	  govern	  themselves	  in	  accordance	  with	  mainstream	  norms	  without	  further	  special	  interventions.	  	  5.	  “Liberal”	  Moral	  Reform?	  Social	  conservatives	  who	  advocate	  moral	  reform	  tend	  to	  view	  it	  (sometimes	  along	  with	  private	  charity)	  as	  the	  sole	  remedy	  for	  ghetto	  poverty,	  since	  they	  generally	  regard	  the	  basic	  structure	  of	  U.S.	  society	  as	  just	  and	  thus	  not	  in	  need	  of	  fundamental	  reform	  (at	  least	  not	  in	  an	  egalitarian	  direction).	  Libertarians	  would	  presumably	  not	  accept	  moral	  reform	  as	  a	  
                                            7	  For	  a	  careful	  analysis	  of	  church-­‐state	  collaborations	  in	  poor	  black	  neighborhoods,	  see	  Owens,	  2007.	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legitimate	  aim	  of	  government,	  at	  least	  when	  dealing	  with	  adults.	  They	  do	  not	  regard	  the	  state	  as	  having	  the	  authority	  to	  sustain	  or	  reform	  the	  moral	  character	  of	  adult	  citizens	  (though	  allowances	  for	  children	  may	  be	  permitted).	  Indeed,	  they	  generally	  believe	  that	  it	  is	  impermissible	  for	  government	  to	  take	  paternalistic	  actions	  and	  that	  the	  state’s	  authority	  is	  limited	  to	  protecting	  basic	  rights.	  On	  their	  view,	  citizens	  should	  be	  free	  to	  have	  a	  bad	  character	  and	  to	  embrace	  self-­‐destructive	  cultural	  traits,	  provided	  in	  acting	  on	  these	  dispositions	  they	  do	  not	  violate	  the	  rights	  of	  others.	  Moreover,	  libertarians	  generally	  do	  not	  believe	  the	  state	  should	  institute	  redistributive	  schemes	  to	  reduce	  inequality	  or	  social	  welfare	  measures	  to	  alleviate	  poverty,	  at	  least	  not	  using	  tax	  revenue.	  But	  can	  liberals,	  given	  their	  basic	  values,	  consistently	  support	  moral	  reform?	  In	  speaking	  of	  “liberals,”	  I	  am	  not	  talking	  about	  individual	  Americans’	  self-­‐descriptions	  or	  party	  affiliations.	  I	  have	  in	  mind	  a	  political	  morality	  defined	  by	  a	  distinctive	  set	  of	  value	  commitments	  (which	  might	  be	  described	  as	  “egalitarian	  political	  liberalism”),	  a	  political	  morality	  from	  a	  tradition	  of	  thought	  whose	  canonical	  exponents	  include	  Kant,	  Mill,	  and	  Rawls.	  In	  this	  way,	  there	  will	  be	  “liberals”	  (as	  defined	  by	  their	  self-­‐description	  or	  Democratic	  Party	  affiliation)	  who	  are	  not	  liberals	  in	  my	  sense.8 Thus,	  a	  liberal	  who	  supported	  moral	  reform	  would	  presumably	  view	  such	  measures	  as	  only	  part	  of	  the	  solution	  to	  ghetto	  poverty.	  State-­‐supported	  moral	  reform	  would	  have	  to	  be	  joined	  with	  policy	  efforts	  to	  make	  the	  opportunity	  structure	  fairer	  and	  the	  distribution	  of	  resources	  more	  equitable.	  Liberals	  who	  accept	  the	  suboptimal	  cultural	  divergence	  thesis	  typically	  regard	  the	  relevant	  cultural	  traits	  prominent	  in	  ghettos	  as	  a	  response	  or	  adaptation	  to	  unjust	  structural	  conditions.	  The	  relevant	  injustices	  include	  pervasive	  racial	  discrimination	  (for	  example	  in	  employment,	  housing,	  lending,	  and	  law	  enforcement);	  diminished	  life	  prospects	  due	  to	  unfair	  economic	  and	  educational	  disadvantages;	  
                                            8	  For	  a	  brief	  but	  particularly	  helpful	  discussion	  of	  the	  place	  of	  liberal	  political	  morality	  in	  American	  and	  British	  political	  history,	  see	  Dworkin,	  1985:	  181-­‐204.	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inadequate	  social	  services;	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  social	  safety	  net	  is	  not	  large	  enough	  and	  has	  too	  many	  holes	  to	  catch	  all	  those	  who	  fall	  because	  of	  economic	  restructuring,	  recessions,	  and	  unexpected	  shifts	  in	  the	  labor	  market.	  I	  will	  not	  directly	  discuss	  conservative	  or	  libertarian	  perspectives	  on	  moral	  reform	  in	  the	  ghetto,	  though	  some	  of	  what	  I	  will	  say	  has	  implications	  for	  these	  views.	  Liberals	  generally	  agree	  that	  the	  structure	  of	  U.S.	  society	  is	  unfair,	  though	  they	  obviously	  disagree	  about	  the	  extent	  of	  its	  unfairness.	  In	  fact,	  a	  number	  of	  prominent	  liberal	  thinkers	  hold	  that	  unjust	  forms	  of	  exclusion,	  unequal	  opportunities,	  and	  economic	  inequality	  produced	  and	  continue	  to	  sustain	  ghetto	  poverty	  (Fiss,	  2003;	  Barry,	  2005;	  Anderson,	  2010).	  Liberals	  also	  tend	  to	  think	  that	  government	  should	  do	  something	  proactive	  about	  poverty,	  instituting	  feasible	  antipoverty	  measures	  as	  necessary.	  Some	  might	  therefore	  be	  tempted	  to	  accept	  (or,	  indeed,	  may	  wholeheartedly	  endorse)	  moral	  reform	  as	  part	  of	  the	  solution	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  ghetto	  poverty.	  My	  aim	  over	  the	  next	  few	  sections	  will	  be	  to	  argue	  that	  this	  liberal	  position	  is	  neither	  wise	  nor	  morally	  coherent.	  My	  argument	  will	  pivot	  around	  the	  idea	  of	  “self-­‐respect.”	  	  6.	  Self-­‐Esteem	  and	  Unjust	  Social	  Conditions	  Self-­‐respect	  is	  a	  value	  open	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  interpretations	  and	  definitions.	  John	  Rawls	  (1999:	  386-­‐391)	  emphasizes	  the	  importance	  of	  ensuring	  that	  citizens	  have	  an	  opportunity	  to	  develop	  a	  sense	  of	  self-­‐respect.	  However,	  instead	  of	  using	  the	  term	  “self-­‐respect”	  to	  refer	  to	  what	  Rawls	  has	  in	  mind,	  I	  will	  use	  “self-­‐esteem”	  (a	  term	  Rawls	  uses	  as	  a	  synonym).	  Following	  others	  (Darwall,	  1977;	  Thomas,	  1978;	  Sachs,	  1981;	  Boxill,	  1992:	  186-­‐199),	  I	  want	  to	  distinguish	  this	  value	  from	  a	  different	  though	  related	  one	  that	  we	  might	  also	  want	  to	  call	  “self-­‐respect,”	  a	  topic	  I	  will	  turn	  to	  in	  the	  next	  section.	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   Self-­‐esteem	  has	  two	  aspects:	  (1)	  a	  secure	  conviction	  that	  one’s	  fundamental	  purposes	  (one’s	  conception	  of	  the	  good)	  are	  worthwhile	  and	  (2)	  confidence	  in	  one’s	  ability	  to	  realize	  these	  purposes.	  So,	  self-­‐esteem	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  self-­‐confidence—confidence	  in	  the	  value	  of	  one’s	  basic	  ambitions	  and	  confidence	  in	  one’s	  ability	  to	  realize	  these	  aims.	  Or,	  put	  another	  way,	  self-­‐esteem	  is	  a	  combination	  of	  self-­‐worth	  and	  self-­‐efficacy.	  We	  have	  a	  healthy	  sense	  of	  self-­‐esteem	  when	  we	  regard	  our	  fundamental	  ends	  as	  valuable	  and	  consider	  ourselves	  competent	  to	  secure	  these	  ends.	  We	  have	  a	  diminished	  or	  damaged	  sense	  of	  self-­‐esteem	  when	  we	  think	  our	  plans	  in	  life	  lack	  value	  or	  we	  are	  plagued	  by	  self-­‐doubt.	  In	  any	  pluralist	  society,	  where	  by	  definition	  there	  is	  deep	  disagreement	  about	  fundamental	  values,	  citizens	  will	  often	  adhere	  to	  conflicting	  conceptions	  of	  the	  good	  life.	  But	  a	  primary	  good,	  again	  following	  Rawls,	  is	  something	  that	  any	  rational	  person	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  want	  regardless	  of	  his	  or	  her	  particular	  conception	  of	  the	  good.	  Such	  goods	  include	  liberty,	  leisure,	  income,	  and	  wealth.	  Self-­‐esteem	  is	  a	  primary	  good	  because	  in	  its	  absence	  nothing	  may	  seem	  worth	  doing	  or	  we	  may	  not	  attempt	  to	  achieve	  those	  things	  we	  regard	  as	  valuable.	  Apathy,	  depression,	  and	  despair	  may	  take	  over.	  Moreover,	  one	  generally	  feels	  shame	  when	  one	  experiences	  an	  injury	  to	  one’s	  self-­‐esteem.	  This	  shame	  is	  a	  response	  to	  one’s	  failure	  to	  exhibit	  the	  personal	  qualities	  one	  regards	  as	  most	  worthwhile.	  	  Rawls	  views	  self-­‐esteem	  as	  a	  natural	  primary	  good,	  rather	  than	  a	  social	  one,	  because	  society,	  and	  in	  particular	  the	  state,	  has	  no	  mechanism	  for	  distributing	  self-­‐esteem	  directly.9	  However,	  there	  are	  social	  bases	  of	  self-­‐esteem	  that	  a	  social	  structure	  can	  either	  support	  or	  undermine.	  One’s	  sense	  of	  self-­‐worth	  (the	  first	  component	  of	  self-­‐esteem)	  is	  socially	  supported	  when	  those	  one	  admires	  appreciate	  and	  affirm	  one’s	  values	  and	  achievements.	  One	  will	  usually	  develop	  and	  maintain	  a	  sense	  of	  self-­‐worth	  provided	  one	  
                                            9	  Some	  people	  have	  lower	  self-­‐esteem	  than	  they	  otherwise	  would	  because	  of	  clinical	  depression,	  which	  can	  sometimes	  be	  effectively	  treated.	  Government	  could	  enable	  those	  who	  need	  it	  to	  get	  access	  to	  such	  treatment.	  But	  this	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  distributing	  self-­‐esteem;	  it	  is	  a	  way	  of	  repairing	  damaged	  self-­‐esteem.	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belongs	  to	  at	  least	  one	  association	  or	  community	  within	  which	  one’s	  activities	  are	  publicly	  affirmed.	  These	  associative	  or	  communal	  ties	  also	  strengthen	  self-­‐efficacy	  (the	  second	  component	  of	  self-­‐esteem),	  for	  they	  reduce	  the	  likelihood	  of	  failure	  and	  provide	  collective	  defense	  against	  self-­‐doubt	  when	  failure	  does	  occur.	  Rawls	  maintains,	  and	  I	  agree,	  that	  in	  a	  just	  democratic	  society	  with	  a	  pluralist	  ethos,	  there	  will	  be	  a	  diverse	  array	  of	  informal	  communities	  and	  formal	  associations,	  and	  that	  the	  members	  of	  these	  groupings	  will	  develop	  ideals	  that	  cohere	  with	  their	  aspirations	  and	  talents.	  The	  question	  that	  I	  want	  to	  address,	  which	  Rawls	  does	  not	  deal	  with,	  is	  what	  should	  we	  expect	  in	  an	  unjust	  society?	  In	  an	  unjust	  society	  there	  may	  also	  be	  a	  variety	  of	  communities	  and	  associations	  with	  their	  own	  ideals,	  and	  these	  forms	  of	  group	  affiliation	  may	  also	  develop	  among	  those	  who	  are	  severely	  disadvantaged.	  Moreover,	  the	  cultural	  traits	  that	  characterize	  some	  of	  these	  communities	  and	  associations	  may	  have	  been	  cultivated	  in	  response	  to,	  or	  otherwise	  shaped	  by,	  the	  unjust	  institutional	  arrangements.	  These	  associations	  and	  communities	  may	  nevertheless	  perform	  essentially	  the	  same	  social	  function—namely,	  sustaining	  and	  enhancing	  self-­‐esteem—as	  their	  counterparts	  under	  just	  arrangements.	  	  7.	  Self-­‐Respect	  and	  Unjust	  Social	  Conditions	  Self-­‐respect	  is	  to	  be	  distinguished	  from	  self-­‐esteem.	  Self-­‐respect	  can	  be	  an	  element	  of	  a	  person’s	  sense	  of	  self-­‐worth.	  But,	  unlike	  self-­‐esteem,	  the	  role	  it	  plays	  in	  constituting	  self-­‐worth	  is	  not	  contingent	  on	  a	  person’s	  particular	  ambitions	  or	  self-­‐confidence.	  Self-­‐respect	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  recognizing	  oneself	  as	  a	  rational	  agent	  and	  a	  moral	  equal	  and	  valuing	  oneself	  accordingly	  (Hill,	  1991:	  ch.	  1;	  Boxill,	  1992:	  186-­‐199;	  Sachs,	  1981).	  Self-­‐respect	  is	  embodied	  and	  expressed	  in	  the	  way	  one	  conducts	  oneself.	  Those	  with	  self-­‐respect	  live	  their	  lives	  in	  a	  way	  that	  conveys	  their	  conviction	  that	  they	  are	  proper	  objects	  of	  respect.	  For	  example,	  they	  
Liberalism,	  Self-­‐Respect,	  and	  Troubling	  Cultural	  Patterns	  in	  Ghettos	  •	  Tommie	  Shelby	  
 
25 
resist	  the	  efforts	  of	  others	  to	  mistreat	  them	  and	  openly	  resent	  unfair	  treatment.	  Moreover,	  persons	  with	  self-­‐respect	  do	  not	  believe	  that	  they	  must	  earn	  just	  treatment	  through,	  say,	  some	  display	  of	  virtue	  or	  personal	  achievement.	  They	  know	  that	  their	  capacity	  for	  moral	  agency	  alone	  is	  sufficient	  to	  justify	  their	  right	  to	  justice.	  When	  self-­‐respect	  is	  healthy	  and	  widespread	  in	  a	  society,	  this	  helps	  to	  sustain	  just	  practices	  and	  to	  deter	  injustice.	  And	  where	  there	  is	  systemic	  injustice,	  the	  self-­‐respect	  of	  society’s	  members	  often	  moves	  them	  to	  reform	  their	  institutions.	  Thus,	  those	  with	  a	  robust	  sense	  of	  justice	  should	  be	  concerned	  to	  maintain	  and	  foster	  self-­‐respect	  in	  themselves	  and	  others.	  However,	  self-­‐respect	  has	  value	  quite	  apart	  from	  its	  contribution	  to	  maintaining	  or	  establishing	  a	  just	  society.	  Its	  value	  should	  not	  be	  reduced	  to	  how	  it	  promotes	  the	  general	  welfare	  or	  greatest	  good.	  Moral	  agents	  are	  permitted	  to	  preserve,	  express,	  and	  strengthen	  their	  self-­‐respect	  even	  when	  doing	  so	  would	  not	  ameliorate	  unjust	  conditions,	  would	  not	  lighten	  their	  material	  burdens,	  and	  would	  be	  personally	  costly	  or	  risky.	  Self-­‐respect	  is	  thus	  best	  understood	  as	  a	  component	  of	  a	  non-­‐consequentialist	  moral	  outlook	  (Kamm,	  1992).	  As	  the	  philosophers	  Thomas	  Hill	  (1991:	  ch.	  1)	  and	  Bernard	  Boxill	  (1992:	  186-­‐199)	  have	  argued,	  the	  person	  who	  lacks	  self-­‐respect	  fails	  to	  have	  the	  right	  attitude	  about	  his	  or	  her	  moral	  status.	  By	  putting	  up	  with	  injustice	  without	  complaint	  or	  protest,	  one	  does	  not	  give	  morality	  the	  regard	  it	  merits.	  This	  conception	  of	  self-­‐respect	  focuses	  on	  the	  need	  to	  show	  respect	  for	  moral	  requirements.	  But	  those	  most	  burdened	  by	  injustice	  have	  additional	  reasons	  to	  preserve	  and	  express	  their	  self-­‐respect.	  Maintaining	  one’s	  self-­‐respect	  in	  the	  face	  of	  injustice	  is	  not	  simply	  about	  respecting	  the	  authority	  of	  morality.	  The	  sense	  of	  personal	  investment	  in	  such	  respect	  would	  be	  inexplicable	  if	  self-­‐respect	  were	  merely	  about	  respecting	  moral	  principles.	  Self-­‐respect	  has	  value	  from	  a	  personal	  point	  of	  view	  and	  not	  only	  from	  an	  impartial	  vantage	  point	  (Scheffler,	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1982).	  A	  life	  lived	  without	  a	  healthy	  sense	  of	  self-­‐respect,	  particularly	  for	  one	  who	  is	  oppressed,	  is	  an	  impoverished	  life	  for	  the	  particular	  person	  whose	  life	  it	  is.	  Oppression	  can	  erode	  a	  person’s	  sense	  of	  self-­‐respect,	  causing	  one	  to	  doubt	  one’s	  claim	  to	  equal	  moral	  status.	  We	  can	  understand	  an	  attack	  on	  one’s	  self-­‐respect	  as	  an	  action,	  policy,	  or	  practice	  that	  threatens	  to	  make	  one	  feel	  or	  believe	  that	  one	  is	  morally	  inferior,	  that	  one	  does	  not	  deserve	  the	  same	  treatment	  as	  others.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  such	  attacks,	  one	  can	  come	  to	  have	  a	  damaged	  sense	  of	  self-­‐respect.	  To	  maintain	  a	  healthy	  sense	  of	  self-­‐respect,	  the	  oppressed	  may	  therefore	  fight	  back	  against	  their	  oppressors,	  demanding	  the	  justice	  they	  know	  they	  deserve—even	  when	  the	  available	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  justice	  is	  not	  forthcoming.	  They	  thereby	  affirm	  their	  moral	  worth	  and	  equal	  status.	  Agents	  that	  take	  action	  to	  affirm	  their	  moral	  standing	  often	  take	  pride	  in	  such	  actions,	  particularly	  when	  these	  acts	  entail	  some	  personal	  risks	  or	  costs.	  When	  one	  is	  subject	  to	  persistent	  injustice	  and	  yet	  successfully	  defends	  one’s	  self-­‐respect,	  this	  is	  a	  moral	  achievement.	  A	  robust	  disposition	  to	  resist	  attacks	  on	  one’s	  self-­‐respect	  can	  therefore	  be	  a	  source	  of	  self-­‐esteem.	  Such	  self-­‐valuing	  is	  moral	  pride.	  Conversely,	  submission	  to	  injustice	  can	  be	  a	  culpable	  failure	  that	  generates	  moral	  shame	  in	  the	  subject.	  We	  surrender	  or	  sacrifice	  our	  self-­‐respect	  when	  we	  acquiesce	  to	  mistreatment	  or	  when	  we	  suffer	  such	  indignities	  in	  silence.	  Persons	  with	  a	  strong	  sense	  of	  self-­‐respect	  sometimes	  refuse	  to	  cooperate	  with	  the	  demands	  of	  an	  unjust	  society.	  They	  stand	  up	  for	  themselves,	  are	  defiant	  in	  the	  face	  of	  illegitimate	  authority,	  refuse	  to	  comply	  with	  unjust	  social	  requirements,	  protest	  maltreatment	  and	  humiliation,	  and	  so	  on,	  even	  when	  they	  know	  such	  actions	  will	  not	  bring	  
about	  justice	  or	  reduce	  their	  suffering.	  Self-­‐respect,	  then,	  can	  be	  a	  matter	  living	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  moral	  pride	  despite	  unjust	  conditions.	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Though	  self-­‐respect	  has	  intrinsic	  value	  and	  great	  moral	  importance,	  it	  should	  not	  be	  treated	  as	  a	  trump	  in	  moral	  deliberation.	  Moral	  agents	  need	  not	  defend	  their	  self-­‐respect	  at	  all	  cost.	  It	  is	  sometimes	  justifiable	  or	  excusable	  to	  sacrifice	  a	  bit	  of	  self-­‐respect	  to	  protect	  others	  from	  harm,	  to	  avoid	  grave	  harm	  to	  oneself,	  or	  to	  achieve	  some	  worthy	  goal.	  Such	  sacrifices	  are	  sometimes	  necessary,	  all	  things	  considered.	  However,	  the	  agent	  with	  a	  healthy	  sense	  of	  self-­‐respect	  experiences	  them	  as	  sacrifices—as	  the	  painful	  loss	  of	  an	  intrinsically	  valuable	  good.	  When	  you	  no	  longer	  care	  that	  others	  are	  wronging	  you,	  putting	  up	  no	  resistance,	  or	  when	  you	  routinely	  trade	  fair	  treatment	  for	  mere	  material	  gain	  or	  social	  status,	  you	  have	  lost	  all	  self-­‐respect.	  With	  these	  remarks	  as	  background,	  I	  can	  briefly	  state	  my	  principal	  objection	  to	  moral	  reform:	  Even	  if	  the	  suboptimal	  cultural	  divergence	  hypothesis	  is	  basically	  sound,	  moral	  reform	  attacks	  the	  ghetto	  poor’s	  social	  bases	  of	  self-­‐esteem	  and	  fails	  to	  honor	  their	  need	  to	  preserve	  their	  self-­‐respect.	  These	  two	  consequences	  create	  serious	  practical	  limitations	  and	  moral	  pitfalls.	  Moral	  reform	  is	  furthermore	  incompatible	  with	  respect	  for	  personal	  autonomy—i.e.,	  with	  an	  agent’s	  legitimate	  claim	  to	  govern	  his	  or	  her	  own	  life	  as	  that	  agent	  judges	  fit.	  In	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  chapter,	  I	  will	  elaborate	  on	  these	  concerns	  and	  then	  close	  by	  sketching	  an	  alternative	  approach	  that	  I	  believe	  avoids	  these	  difficulties,	  is	  more	  in	  line	  with	  core	  liberal	  values,	  and	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  effective	  in	  achieving	  the	  needed	  cultural	  and	  structural	  reforms.	  	  8.	  The	  Practical	  Limits	  of	  Moral	  Outreach	  As	  outlined	  in	  sections	  3	  and	  4,	  the	  methods	  of	  moral	  reform	  vary	  greatly.	  One	  class	  of	  methods,	  which	  we	  might	  call	  “moral	  outreach,”	  relies	  on	  dialogue,	  lectures,	  sermons,	  education,	  training,	  and	  counseling.	  The	  idea	  is	  to	  effect	  a	  change	  in	  cultural	  patterns	  through,	  for	  example,	  moral	  exhortation,	  role	  models,	  counseling	  services,	  educational	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programs,	  or	  faith-­‐based	  efforts.	  Some	  of	  these	  interventions	  amount	  to	  no	  more	  than	  attempting	  to	  convince	  some	  among	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  that	  their	  cultural	  ways	  are	  harmful	  to	  themselves	  and	  others.	  Other	  interventions	  might	  seek	  to	  make	  some	  residents	  of	  ghettos	  ashamed	  of	  their	  suboptimal	  mores,	  to	  encourage	  them	  to	  take	  pride	  in	  exemplifying	  mainstream	  values	  and	  identities,	  or	  both.	  This	  could	  be	  supplemented	  with	  attempts	  to	  get	  targets	  of	  moral	  reform	  to	  identify	  less	  with	  suboptimal	  ghetto	  cultural	  patterns	  and	  more	  with	  the	  successful	  habits	  and	  values	  of	  middle-­‐class	  persons.	  The	  main	  challenge	  for	  moral	  outreach	  is	  getting	  its	  targets	  to	  listen	  to	  these	  appeals	  and	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  these	  programs.	  Moral	  outreach	  would	  seem	  to	  have	  the	  best	  chance	  of	  success	  with	  those	  for	  whom	  the	  weak	  version	  of	  the	  cultural	  divergence	  thesis	  applies—those	  who	  strategically	  employ	  ghetto-­‐specific	  cultural	  repertoire	  only	  because	  they	  believe	  they	  lack	  a	  fair	  opportunity	  for	  socioeconomic	  advancement.	  For	  then,	  assuming	  more	  favorable	  circumstances,	  some	  willing	  cooperation	  with	  moral	  reform	  programs	  could	  be	  expected.	  This	  cooperation	  might	  be	  forthcoming	  once	  the	  opportunity	  structure	  was	  sufficiently	  fair	  such	  that	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  could	  escape	  poverty	  if	  they	  embraced	  more	  mainstream	  cultural	  ways.	  There	  might	  also	  be	  some	  willing	  cooperation	  if	  those	  targeted	  for	  moral	  outreach	  were	  looking	  for	  any	  escape	  from	  ghetto	  poverty,	  even	  if,	  for	  example,	  the	  opportunity	  structure	  remained	  unjust	  and	  thus	  most,	  no	  matter	  what	  they	  did,	  would	  remain	  in	  poverty	  and	  in	  deeply	  disadvantaged	  and	  segregated	  neighborhoods.	  The	  lucky	  few	  would	  only	  have	  to	  be	  convinced	  that	  there	  are	  more	  exits	  from	  ghetto	  poverty	  than	  there	  are	  people	  actively	  trying	  to	  leave.	  But	  what	  if	  there	  are	  many	  who	  have	  suboptimal	  ghetto	  identities	  (i.e.,	  those	  for	  whom	  the	  strong	  version	  of	  the	  cultural	  divergence	  thesis	  applies)	  and	  the	  social	  structure	  continues	  to	  be	  unfairly	  stacked	  against	  the	  ghetto	  poor?	  Here	  it	  seems	  that	  moral	  outreach	  would	  have	  limited	  success.	  After	  all,	  our	  conception	  of	  the	  good	  determines	  what	  we	  feel	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ashamed	  of	  and	  take	  pride	  in,	  so	  shame	  and	  pride	  are	  relative	  to	  our	  fundamental	  goals	  and	  to	  the	  communities	  with	  which	  we	  identify.	  If	  putative	  targets	  for	  moral	  reform	  reject	  mainstream	  values	  and	  embrace	  ghetto	  identities,	  as	  the	  strong	  version	  of	  the	  cultural	  divergence	  thesis	  asserts,	  they	  will	  not	  be	  readily	  shamed	  into	  conforming	  to	  mainstream	  norms;	  nor	  should	  we	  expect	  them	  to	  take	  pride	  in	  embodying	  mainstream	  virtues.	  They	  will	  have	  developed	  alternative	  sources	  of	  self-­‐worth	  that	  do	  not	  depend	  on	  mainstream	  institutions	  for	  validation.	  A	  similar	  point	  can	  be	  made	  about	  self-­‐efficacy.	  Self-­‐efficacy	  is,	  again,	  confidence	  in	  one’s	  capacity	  to	  achieve	  one’s	  fundamental	  ambitions.	  Some	  among	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  may	  be	  confident	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  succeed,	  even	  by	  mainstream	  standards,	  if	  the	  opportunity	  
structure	  they	  faced	  were	  fairer.	  Because	  they	  believe	  their	  efforts	  to	  meet	  mainstream	  standards	  of	  success	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  thwarted	  by	  a	  deeply	  unjust	  social	  structure,	  these	  persons	  may	  develop	  alternative	  ambitions	  (McGary,	  1992).	  Where	  people	  blame	  the	  unfairness	  of	  the	  social	  structure	  for	  their	  inability	  to	  achieve	  their	  ambitions,	  they	  need	  not	  experience	  low	  self-­‐esteem.	  And	  we	  have	  even	  less	  reason	  to	  suspect	  diminished	  self-­‐esteem	  in	  those	  cases	  where,	  in	  response	  to	  their	  conviction	  that	  their	  society	  is	  unjust,	  people	  develop	  basic	  aims	  that	  they	  believe	  to	  be	  worthwhile	  and	  within	  reach.10	  	  	   Indeed,	  the	  more	  those	  perceived	  as	  “outsiders,”	  and	  official	  agents	  of	  the	  state	  in	  particular,	  attack	  ghetto	  identities,	  the	  more	  those	  who	  subscribe	  to	  these	  identities	  are	  likely	  to	  hold	  firmly	  to	  them.	  By	  hypothesis,	  there	  are	  distinctive	  forms	  of	  affiliation	  and	  community	  in	  ghetto	  neighborhoods	  that	  are	  central	  bases	  for	  the	  positive	  sense	  of	  self-­‐worth	  of	  many	  among	  the	  ghetto	  poor.	  Those	  with	  ghetto	  identities	  will	  therefore	  demand	  a	  
                                            10	  The	  argument	  of	  this	  paragraph	  and	  the	  previous	  one	  are	  offered	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  not	  all	  ghetto	  identities	  are	  the	  product	  of	  false	  consciousness,	  rationalization,	  or	  bad	  faith.	  That	  is,	  I	  am	  assuming	  that	  these	  identities	  have	  not	  all	  been	  formed	  as	  an	  unconscious	  psychological	  defense	  mechanism	  against	  a	  debilitating	  sense	  of	  personal	  failure	  and	  individual	  incompetence.	  I	  take	  it	  that	  some	  ghetto	  identities	  are	  consciously	  adopted	  in	  light	  of	  the	  sincere	  and	  justified	  judgment	  that	  U.S.	  society	  is	  unjust	  and	  that	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  in	  particular	  do	  not	  have	  a	  fair	  shot	  in	  life	  as	  a	  result.	  For	  a	  classic	  defense	  of	  the	  view	  that	  some	  ghetto	  identities	  are	  rationalizations	  that	  stave	  off	  a	  sense	  of	  failure	  and	  incompetence,	  see	  Liebow,	  1967.	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compelling	  reason	  to	  change	  their	  conception	  of	  the	  good.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  more	  just	  opportunity	  structure,	  garnering	  the	  esteem	  of	  their	  more	  advantaged	  fellows	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  reason	  enough.	  Recall	  that	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  on	  state-­‐operated	  or	  state-­‐supported	  moral	  reform.	  However,	  in	  response	  to	  the	  alleged	  debilitating	  effects	  of	  some	  ghetto	  cultural	  patterns,	  there	  are	  some	  who	  propose,	  not	  government	  intervention,	  but	  moral	  outreach	  on	  the	  part	  of	  black	  elites,	  a	  kind	  of	  group	  uplift	  or	  self-­‐help	  (Loury,	  1995;	  Cosby	  and	  Poussaint,	  2007).	  Though	  such	  moral	  appeals	  may	  not	  be	  inherently	  objectionable,	  the	  strong	  version	  of	  the	  cultural	  divergence	  thesis	  suggests	  that	  this	  outreach	  would	  be	  rather	  limited	  in	  its	  effectiveness.	  Black	  elites	  are,	  in	  many	  ways,	  representatives	  of	  the	  mainstream.	  They	  exemplify	  its	  values	  and	  practices.	  Insofar	  as	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  are	  alienated	  from	  mainstream	  values,	  they	  are	  likely	  to	  look	  upon	  black	  elites	  with	  similar	  suspicion.	  This	  is	  all	  the	  more	  likely	  if,	  as	  I	  have	  argued	  elsewhere	  (Shelby,	  2005:	  ch.	  2),	  many	  among	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  believe	  that	  black	  elite	  moral	  exhortations	  are	  motivated	  less	  by	  genuine	  concern	  and	  group	  solidarity	  and	  more	  by	  elites’	  feeling	  embarrassed	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  whites	  by	  the	  unruly	  behavior	  of	  poor	  urban	  blacks	  or	  by	  their	  fear	  that	  they	  might	  be	  mistaken	  for	  one	  with	  a	  ghetto	  identity.	  	  9.	  Racism	  and	  Cultural	  Explanations	  of	  Black	  Poverty	  There	  is	  a	  second	  practical	  limitation	  to	  moral	  outreach.	  Some	  of	  the	  cultural	  traits	  attributed	  to	  or	  associated	  with	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  (e.g.,	  beliefs	  and	  attitudes	  toward	  authority,	  work,	  violence,	  parenting,	  sex	  and	  reproduction,	  school,	  and	  crime)	  resemble	  well-­‐known	  racist	  stereotypes	  about	  blacks	  (e.g.,	  their	  supposed	  tendencies	  toward	  lawlessness,	  laziness,	  dishonesty,	  irresponsibility,	  gross	  ignorance,	  substandard	  cognitive	  ability,	  parasitic	  reliance	  on	  government	  aid,	  and	  sexual	  promiscuity).	  Thus,	  an	  implication	  of	  the	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cultural	  divergence	  thesis	  is	  that	  deeply	  disadvantaged	  and	  segregated	  metropolitan	  neighborhoods	  have	  produced	  a	  subgroup	  of	  blacks	  who,	  because	  of	  their	  cultural	  patterns,	  exhibit	  characteristics	  that	  racists	  have	  long	  maintained	  are	  “natural”	  to	  the	  black	  race	  and	  that	  these	  cultural	  traits	  are	  at	  least	  part	  of	  the	  explanation	  for	  why	  they	  are	  poor.	  I	  suspect	  that	  this	  implication	  is	  part	  of	  the	  reason	  many	  people	  are	  suspicious	  of,	  even	  hostile	  to,	  cultural	  analyses	  of	  black	  urban	  poverty—they	  smell	  like	  racist	  rationalizations	  for	  the	  status	  quo.	  To	  make	  matters	  worse,	  moral	  reform	  suggests	  that	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  are	  effectively	  incapable	  of	  altering	  these	  suboptimal	  traits	  on	  their	  own,	  as	  it	  calls	  for	  state	  intervention	  to	  change	  them.	  Moral	  reform	  programs,	  even	  voluntary	  ones,	  would	  be	  implicitly	  endorsing	  the	  idea	  that	  poor	  blacks	  have	  deficiencies	  that	  they	  alone	  cannot	  remedy.	  In	  an	  era	  when	  biological	  racism	  has	  been	  largely	  discredited	  and	  claims	  that	  blacks	  are	  biologically	  inferior	  are	  not	  publically	  acceptable,	  moral	  reform	  will	  inevitably	  strike	  many	  as	  the	  functional	  equivalent	  of	  classic	  racist	  doctrines.11	  Perhaps	  such	  a	  response	  to	  moral	  reform	  would	  be	  cynical	  or	  unfair.	  The	  point	  I	  want	  to	  emphasize,	  though,	  is	  that	  many	  among	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  have	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  some	  of	  their	  fellow	  citizens	  are	  attracted	  to	  cultural	  explanations	  of	  poverty	  because	  of	  racial	  bias.	  Regardless	  of	  their	  merit,	  the	  types	  of	  claims	  made	  about	  the	  black	  poor	  are	  often	  perceived	  as	  emanating	  not	  from	  genuine	  concern	  or	  empathy	  but	  from	  racial	  hostility	  or	  indifference	  to	  the	  plight	  of	  disadvantaged	  blacks.	  In	  light	  of	  this,	  some	  poor	  ghetto	  denizens	  may	  resist	  or	  distrust	  efforts	  to	  change	  the	  cultural	  patterns	  in	  their	  neighborhoods.	  Their	  suspicion	  would	  be	  well	  grounded,	  for	  some	  who	  advocate	  moral	  reform	  no	  doubt	  do	  so	  because	  of	  race-­‐based	  contempt	  or	  a	  desire	  to	  maintain	  the	  racial	  status	  quo	  (Bobo	  et	  al,	  1997;	  Holt,	  2000;	  Mendelberg,	  2001;	  Brown	  et	  al,	  2003).	  On	  grounds	  
                                            11	  It	  might	  be	  thought	  that	  a	  race-­‐neutral	  moral	  reform	  policy	  that	  targets	  all	  poor	  people	  would	  not	  run	  into	  this	  problem.	  But	  this	  is	  not	  so	  clear.	  There	  is	  a	  long	  history	  of	  “race-­‐neutral”	  policies	  with	  racist	  intent—from	  policies	  that	  concern	  voting	  rights	  to	  the	  criminal	  justice	  system	  to	  welfare—and	  most	  blacks	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  this	  history.	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of	  self-­‐respect,	  then,	  the	  oppressed	  may	  refuse	  to	  avoid	  “confirming”	  the	  stereotypes	  that	  are	  often	  used	  to	  justify	  their	  subordination.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  serious	  structural	  reform,	  the	  suggestion	  that	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  do	  not	  value	  hard	  work	  and	  education	  or	  that	  they	  do	  not	  respect	  the	  law	  and	  are	  irresponsible	  parents	  will	  strike	  some	  among	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  as	  yet	  another	  racist	  excuse	  for	  not	  improving	  social	  conditions	  in	  ghetto	  neighborhoods.	  My	  point	  is	  a	  practical	  one:	  namely,	  if	  there	  are	  some	  among	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  who	  possess	  ghetto	  identities,	  as	  the	  strong	  version	  of	  the	  cultural	  divergence	  thesis	  supposes,	  then	  these	  persons	  are	  likely	  to	  dismiss	  outright	  or	  strongly	  resist	  attempts	  by	  representatives	  of	  the	  “mainstream”	  to	  undermine	  or	  alter	  those	  identities.	  Some	  moral	  reform	  efforts	  targeted	  at	  those	  with	  ghetto	  identities	  will	  therefore	  be	  self-­‐defeating.	  So	  even	  if	  some	  poor	  urban	  blacks	  should	  be	  encouraged	  to	  abandon	  or	  change	  their	  ghetto	  identities,	  a	  different	  approach	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  necessary.	  	  10.	  Moral	  Paternalism	  and	  Compromises	  with	  Injustice	  Recognizing	  the	  practical	  limits	  of	  moral	  outreach,	  moral	  reformers	  may	  give	  up	  on	  this	  strategy	  or	  supplement	  it	  with	  more	  aggressive	  measures.	  Instead	  of	  relying	  on	  moral	  outreach	  alone,	  they	  may	  advocate	  cultural	  rehabilitation	  through	  a	  system	  of	  rewards	  and	  sanctions.	  This	  strategy	  would	  not	  depend	  on	  the	  willing	  or	  full	  cooperation	  of	  the	  intended	  beneficiaries.	  The	  moral	  reformers	  would	  attempt	  to	  arrange	  society’s	  incentive	  structure	  to	  produce	  a	  deep	  cultural	  transformation	  in	  their	  subjects.	  Their	  subjects,	  however,	  may	  not	  (fully)	  realize	  what	  their	  benefactors	  are	  attempting	  to	  accomplish,	  or	  may	  not	  willingly	  go	  along,	  or	  may	  not	  desire	  the	  change	  in	  themselves	  the	  reformers	  want	  to	  effect.	  In	  this	  way,	  moral	  reformers	  work	  on,	  not	  with,	  the	  ghetto	  poor.	  Their	  methods	  are	  intended	  to	  be	  effective	  despite	  resistance	  from	  the	  black	  urban	  poor.	  Call	  this	  mode	  of	  moral	  reform	  “moral	  paternalism.”	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   Many	  liberals	  find	  the	  idea	  of	  moral	  paternalism	  distasteful.	  In	  an	  ideal	  world,	  they	  would	  no	  doubt	  eschew	  it.	  But	  faced	  with	  current	  social	  and	  political	  realities	  and	  in	  light	  of	  their	  abiding	  concern	  to	  help	  the	  poor	  and	  disadvantaged,	  some	  may	  be	  tempted	  to	  engage	  in	  some	  forms	  of	  moral	  paternalism.	  For	  example,	  sympathetic	  liberals	  could	  argue	  that	  they	  do	  not	  urge	  moral	  reform	  because	  they	  believe	  the	  criticisms	  leveled	  at	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  are	  entirely	  fair	  or	  always	  spring	  from	  non-­‐racist	  motives.	  They	  might	  simply	  insist	  that	  cultural	  traits	  that	  seem	  to	  confirm	  racist	  stereotypes	  make	  it	  harder	  (if	  not	  impossible)	  to	  generate	  the	  goodwill	  among	  the	  general	  public	  needed	  to	  change	  the	  structural	  conditions	  of	  ghettos.	  These	  liberals	  may	  lament	  the	  fact	  that	  too	  many	  Americans	  regard	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  as	  “undeserving”	  and	  that,	  on	  this	  ground,	  these	  citizens	  are	  unwilling	  to	  invest	  the	  necessary	  resources	  to	  eliminate	  urban	  poverty.	  However,	  without	  the	  support	  of	  at	  least	  some	  of	  these	  people,	  liberal	  structural	  reform	  is	  not	  feasible.	  In	  response	  to	  this	  political	  reality,	  some	  liberals	  may	  be	  prepared	  to	  attach	  stiff	  penalties	  to	  even	  minor	  legal	  infractions,	  to	  impose	  work	  requirements	  on	  welfare	  recipients	  with	  young	  children,	  to	  aggressively	  monitor	  and	  supervise	  the	  behavior	  of	  ghetto	  denizens,	  and	  so	  on,	  because	  without	  cultural	  and	  behavioral	  changes	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  black	  urban	  poor,	  structural	  reform	  will	  be	  nearly	  impossible.	  I	  have	  serious	  doubts	  about	  the	  soundness	  of	  the	  social-­‐theoretic	  assumptions	  behind	  any	  such	  strategy,	  in	  particular	  about	  whether	  reducing	  stereotypical	  behavior	  and	  attitudes	  will	  garner	  the	  desired	  goodwill.	  But	  even	  leaving	  this	  aside,	  I	  would	  insist	  that	  this	  “liberal	  pragmatism”	  threatens	  the	  self-­‐respect	  of	  the	  ghetto	  poor.	  If,	  as	  some	  cultural	  analysts	  maintain,	  the	  suboptimal	  cultural	  traits	  of	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  are	  a	  response	  to	  societal	  injustice,	  then	  it	  is	  not	  reasonable	  to	  expect	  the	  urban	  poor	  to	  submit	  to	  moral	  reform	  to	  “prove”	  their	  worthiness	  for	  government	  interventions	  to	  improve	  structural	  conditions.	  Capitulating	  to	  the	  widely	  held	  and	  insulting	  view	  that	  they	  do	  not	  “deserve”	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better	  life	  chances	  is	  fundamentally	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  maintaining	  their	  self-­‐respect.	  Fair	  treatment	  and	  just	  social	  conditions	  are	  things	  they	  are	  entitled	  to	  in	  virtue	  of	  their	  status	  as	  moral	  equals	  and	  rational	  agents	  and	  cannot	  be	  justly	  withheld	  on	  account	  of	  their	  (alleged)	  unconventional	  identities	  or	  values.	  The	  ghetto	  poor	  have	  legitimate	  justice	  claims	  against	  their	  government	  that	  are	  not	  negated	  by	  what	  they	  do	  in	  response	  to	  that	  government’s	  historical	  and	  still	  persisting	  failure	  to	  honor	  these	  claims.	  As	  Rawls	  (1999:	  273)	  rightly	  points	  out,	  as	  an	  equal	  citizen	  taking	  part	  in	  a	  system	  of	  social	  cooperation,	  each	  acquires	  legitimate	  claims	  on	  fellow	  participants	  as	  defined	  by	  just	  rules	  of	  political	  association.	  And	  we	  should	  not	  regard	  what	  a	  citizen	  is	  entitled	  to	  by	  justice	  as	  proportional	  to,	  nor	  dependent	  upon,	  the	  quality	  of	  his	  or	  her	  moral	  character.	  However,	  since	  I	  accept	  that	  sacrifices	  of	  self-­‐respect	  are	  sometimes	  justified,	  I	  may	  seem	  to	  have	  left	  myself	  open	  to	  the	  following	  rejoinder:	  sometimes	  advancing	  the	  broader	  cause	  of	  justice	  means	  compromising	  with	  particular	  injustices.	  Yes,	  such	  sacrifices	  of	  self-­‐respect	  are	  distasteful	  and	  even	  painful,	  but	  they	  are	  sometimes	  necessary	  in	  the	  short-­‐term	  to	  make	  progress	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  Threatening	  the	  self-­‐respect	  of	  the	  current	  generation	  of	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  may	  simply	  be	  the	  price	  of	  the	  social	  reform	  needed	  to	  ensure	  that	  future	  generations	  do	  not	  grow	  up	  under	  ghetto	  conditions.	  I	  do	  not	  deny	  that	  sacrifices	  of	  self-­‐respect	  can	  be	  warranted.	  It	  may	  be	  perfectly	  reasonable	  for	  one	  to	  suffer	  some	  indignities	  to	  protect	  the	  vulnerable,	  to	  preserve	  one’s	  life,	  or	  even	  to	  advance	  the	  cause	  of	  justice.	  What	  I	  reject	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  others	  are	  permitted	  to	  decide	  for	  you	  when	  you	  should	  make	  such	  sacrifices.	  It	  is	  one	  thing	  to	  ask	  or	  even	  implore	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  to	  sacrifice	  some	  self-­‐respect	  to	  achieve	  needed	  social	  reforms.	  It	  is	  quite	  another	  to	  demand	  that	  they	  make	  these	  sacrifices	  on	  pain	  of	  penalty	  or	  to	  take	  measures	  that	  effectively	  force	  them	  to	  accommodate	  themselves	  to	  injustice.	  Moral	  paternalism	  robs	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  of	  a	  choice	  that	  should	  be	  theirs	  alone—namely,	  whether	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the	  improved	  prospects	  for	  ending	  or	  ameliorating	  ghetto	  poverty	  are	  worth	  the	  loss	  of	  moral	  pride	  they	  would	  incur	  by	  conceding	  the	  insulting	  view	  that	  they	  have	  not	  shown	  themselves	  to	  be	  deserving	  of	  better	  treatment.	  Whether	  such	  sacrifices	  of	  self-­‐respect	  are,	  all	  things	  considered,	  worth	  it	  should	  be	  left	  to	  those	  who	  bear	  the	  burdens	  of	  the	  unjust	  social	  system	  liberals	  seek	  to	  reform.	  Moreover,	  using	  one	  generation	  of	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  as	  unwilling	  instruments	  to	  bring	  about	  justice	  for	  the	  next	  generation	  is	  wrong.	  We	  should	  not	  treat	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  as	  if	  they	  did	  not	  have	  purposes,	  including	  moral	  aims,	  of	  their	  own,	  as	  if	  they	  were	  mere	  things	  that	  can	  be	  turned	  to	  purposes,	  however	  noble,	  that	  we	  see	  as	  fit.	  As	  moral	  agents	  who	  should	  be	  regarded	  as	  equals,	  they	  should	  be	  sought	  out	  as	  willing	  participants	  in	  efforts	  to	  bring	  about	  just	  social	  conditions.	  In	  addition,	  their	  basic	  interests	  in	  equal	  liberty	  and	  respect	  should	  not	  be	  treated	  as	  tradable	  for	  welfare	  gains	  for	  others,	  not	  even	  when	  the	  beneficiaries	  are	  their	  descendants,	  as	  this	  would	  represent	  a	  fundamental	  compromise	  in	  their	  standing	  as	  equal	  citizens	  with	  moral	  rights.	  However,	  a	  liberal	  proponent	  of	  moral	  paternalism	  might	  advocate	  such	  measures	  in	  ghettos,	  not	  as	  a	  cynical	  political	  strategy	  in	  a	  conservative	  era,	  but	  based	  on	  a	  sincere	  belief	  that	  certain	  cultural	  traits	  prevalent	  in	  ghettos	  damage	  the	  well-­‐being	  of	  the	  ghetto	  poor,	  making	  their	  already	  awful	  situation	  worse.	  	  It	  might	  be	  held,	  for	  example,	  that	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  do	  not	  (fully)	  appreciate	  the	  devastating	  effect	  of	  these	  cultural	  traits	  on	  their	  lives.	  Moral	  paternalism,	  then,	  could	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  compassionate	  response	  to	  suboptimal	  cultural	  divergence,	  even	  if	  some	  among	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  fail	  to	  see	  how	  such	  intervention	  is	  in	  their	  best	  interests.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  poor	  in	  ghettos	  should	  find	  this	  stance	  condescending	  and	  offensive.	  Such	  paternalistic	  attitudes	  are	  fundamentally	  incompatible	  with	  the	  liberal	  value	  of	  respect	  for	  persons.	  The	  ghetto	  poor	  are	  free	  persons	  and	  so	  rightly	  expect	  to	  be	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accorded	  the	  equal	  respect	  due	  all	  who	  have	  this	  status.	  Showing	  that	  respect	  means,	  among	  other	  things,	  regarding	  persons	  as	  capable	  of	  revising	  their	  conception	  of	  the	  good	  in	  response	  to	  good	  reasons	  and	  as	  capable	  of	  taking	  responsibility	  for	  their	  basic	  ambitions	  in	  life	  (Rawls,	  1996:	  18-­‐20,	  72-­‐77).	  Apart	  from	  their	  interests	  in	  meeting	  their	  material	  and	  physical	  needs,	  persons	  have	  a	  fundamental	  interest	  in	  being	  treated	  with	  this	  kind	  of	  respect;	  and	  though	  the	  liberal	  desire	  to	  meet	  these	  other	  needs	  is	  laudable,	  this	  goal	  is	  not	  a	  sufficient	  reason	  to	  override	  their	  fellow	  citizens’	  claim	  to	  be	  treated	  as	  free	  and	  equal.	  In	  addition,	  paternalism,	  as	  is	  well	  known,	  is	  hard	  to	  justify	  under	  just	  background	  conditions.	  Paternalism	  toward	  a	  segment	  of	  society	  acknowledged	  to	  be	  victims	  of	  social	  injustice	  is	  all	  the	  more	  suspect.	  	  11.	  Dignity,	  Injustice,	  and	  the	  State	  There	  is	  however	  a	  third	  sense	  of	  “self-­‐respect”	  (different	  from	  the	  two	  discussed	  in	  sections	  6	  and	  7)	  that	  is	  relevant	  to	  our	  discussion,	  and	  which	  we	  might	  call	  “dignity.”	  It	  also	  has	  two	  components:	  (1)	  the	  belief	  that,	  no	  matter	  one’s	  circumstances,	  one	  should	  do	  whatever	  is	  within	  one’s	  power	  to	  secure	  one’s	  basic	  physical,	  material,	  and	  psychological	  well-­‐being	  and	  (2)	  the	  will	  to	  act	  on	  this	  belief.12	  The	  dignified	  person	  is	  resilient	  in	  the	  face	  of	  adversity	  and	  does	  not	  allow	  hardships,	  even	  unjust	  ones,	  to	  make	  him	  or	  her	  feel	  totally	  defeated.	  Constantly	  wallowing	  in	  self-­‐pity	  and	  feelings	  of	  helplessness,	  willfully	  engaging	  in	  self-­‐destructive	  behavior,	  and	  no	  longer	  caring	  about	  whether	  or	  how	  one	  survives	  demonstrate	  that	  one	  does	  not	  value	  oneself	  sufficiently.	  When	  people	  sink	  to	  this	  level	  of	  degradation,	  as	  some	  living	  in	  ghettos	  arguably	  have,	  it	  is	  obvious	  that	  they	  need	  help	  whether	  they	  recognize	  this	  or	  not.	  Thus	  one	  might	  argue	  that	  moral	  paternalism,	  while	  pro	  
tanto	  unjustified,	  is	  permissible	  in	  such	  extreme	  cases.	  	  
                                            12	  Michele	  M.	  Moody-­‐Adams	  (1997)	  suggests	  something	  like	  this	  conception	  of	  self-­‐respect.	  
Liberalism,	  Self-­‐Respect,	  and	  Troubling	  Cultural	  Patterns	  in	  Ghettos	  •	  Tommie	  Shelby	  
 
37 
So	  let	  us	  suppose	  that	  some	  among	  the	  ghetto	  poor,	  unbeknownst	  to	  them,	  do	  need	  help	  freeing	  themselves	  from	  a	  culture	  of	  defeatism	  and	  debasement,	  and	  information	  and	  voluntary	  programs	  would	  be	  insufficient	  to	  the	  task.	  Still,	  I	  think	  it	  would	  be	  morally	  problematic	  for	  a	  person	  or	  organization,	  qua	  representative	  of	  the	  state,	  to	  presume	  to	  be	  the	  appropriate	  agent	  to	  provide	  this	  unrequested	  help,	  at	  least	  when	  this	  assistance	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  moral	  paternalism.	  The	  freedom	  of	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  is	  already	  constrained	  by	  unjust	  conditions,	  which	  the	  state	  has	  failed	  to	  remedy.	  It	  would	  add	  insult	  to	  injury	  for	  the	  state	  to	  further	  constrain	  their	  freedom	  with	  a	  view	  to	  preventing	  them	  from	  making	  themselves	  worse	  off.	  In	  short,	  the	  problem	  is	  this:	  given	  its	  failure	  to	  secure	  just	  social	  
conditions,	  the	  state	  lacks	  the	  moral	  standing	  to	  act	  as	  an	  agent	  of	  moral	  reform.	  The	  state	  could	  perhaps	  earn	  this	  standing,	  but	  only	  after	  it	  had	  made	  real	  and	  sustained	  efforts	  to	  establish	  a	  just	  social	  structure,	  thus	  re-­‐establishing	  its	  legitimacy	  and	  goodwill	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  those	  it	  seeks	  to	  help.13	  Moreover,	  what	  might	  appear	  to	  be	  a	  tragic	  loss	  of	  dignity	  might	  in	  fact	  be	  an	  affirmation	  of	  self-­‐respect.	  Though	  their	  actions	  may	  seem	  to	  signify	  diminished	  dignity,	  those	  with	  suboptimal	  cultural	  characteristics	  might	  not	  have	  given	  up	  on	  life	  and	  might	  not	  be	  suffering	  from	  weakness	  of	  will.	  Rather,	  they	  could	  view	  their	  outlook	  as	  a	  realistic	  stance	  in	  light	  of	  their	  government’s	  wrongful	  actions	  (from	  malign	  neglect	  to	  vicious	  assaults)	  and	  their	  fellow	  citizens’	  self-­‐serving	  contempt.	  They	  might	  choose	  to	  accept	  the	  risks	  and	  bear	  the	  consequences	  of	  their	  cultural	  attitudes	  and	  practices	  rather	  than	  attempt	  to	  live	  in	  accordance	  with	  mainstream	  values	  while	  lacking	  the	  necessary	  resources	  and	  opportunities.	  And	  they	  might	  do	  so	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  moral	  pride.	  Perhaps	  what	  they	  most	  need	  and	  desire,	  then,	  is	  not	  unsolicited	  state-­‐sponsored	  help	  but	  basic	  social	  justice.	  
                                            13	  There	  are	  other	  circumstances	  under	  which	  it	  may	  be	  permissible	  for	  a	  public	  official	  (e.g.,	  a	  social	  worker	  or	  police	  officer)	  to	  intervene	  paternalistically	  to	  help	  those	  who,	  because	  of	  unjust	  treatment	  by	  the	  state,	  have	  become	  incapable	  of	  helping	  themselves.	  For	  instance,	  this	  may	  be	  acceptable	  when	  the	  would-­‐be	  benefactor	  is	  acting	  as	  a	  private	  citizen	  rather	  than	  in	  his	  or	  her	  official	  capacity	  as	  a	  representative	  of	  the	  state.	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One	  way	  to	  respect	  this	  reasonable	  stance	  would	  be	  to	  acknowledge	  their	  prerogative	  to	  decide	  when	  their	  defiant	  behavior	  and	  suboptimal	  cultural	  traits	  are	  worth	  the	  personal	  costs	  and	  risks.	  	  12.	  Moral	  Reform	  and	  Duties	  To	  Others	  The	  position	  I	  am	  advancing	  does	  not	  rely	  on	  the	  dubious	  idea	  that	  the	  oppressed	  can	  never	  be	  morally	  criticized	  for	  how	  they	  respond	  their	  unjust	  conditions.	  Not	  all	  criticisms	  of	  the	  unjustly	  disadvantaged	  is	  problematic	  victim-­‐blaming.	  Moral	  criticism	  of	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  is	  sometimes	  warranted	  or	  appropriate	  despite	  the	  unjust	  conditions	  that	  circumscribe	  their	  lives	  (Boxill,	  1994;	  Shelby,	  2007).	  Those	  mired	  in	  ghetto	  poverty,	  just	  like	  many	  among	  the	  non-­‐poor,	  do	  sometimes	  have	  ambitions	  that	  are	  not	  in	  fact	  worthwhile	  but	  morally	  base	  and	  impermissible.	  They	  sometimes	  choose	  immoral	  means	  to	  achieve	  their	  legitimate	  goals.	  And	  they	  sometimes	  give	  undue	  weight	  in	  deliberation	  to	  some	  of	  their	  group	  affiliations.	  So,	  for	  example,	  it	  is	  morally	  objectionable	  that	  some	  seek	  to	  have	  children	  when	  they	  know	  they	  do	  not	  intend	  to	  help	  raise	  and	  care	  for	  them,	  that	  some	  use	  deadly	  violence	  to	  secure	  luxury	  goods	  and	  social	  status,	  that	  some	  degrade	  and	  sexually	  assault	  others,	  and	  that	  some	  allow	  gang	  loyalty	  to	  trump	  what	  should	  be	  overriding	  moral	  considerations	  like	  respecting	  the	  rights	  of	  others	  and	  assisting	  the	  weak	  and	  vulnerable.	  These	  bases	  of	  self-­‐esteem	  are	  not	  worthy	  of	  our	  respect	  and	  are	  appropriately	  condemned.	  Moreover,	  the	  ghetto	  poor,	  like	  the	  rest	  of	  us,	  have	  moral	  duties	  to	  others	  that	  are	  not	  voided	  because	  of	  unjust	  social	  conditions.	  So	  for	  instance	  we	  should	  all	  refrain	  from	  wrongful	  violent	  aggression	  against	  others	  and	  not	  abuse,	  endanger,	  abandon,	  or	  neglect	  the	  children	  in	  our	  care.	  There	  are,	  and	  should	  be,	  legal	  proscriptions	  against	  these	  wrongful	  actions,	  even	  when	  they	  are	  perpetrated	  by	  the	  unjustly	  disadvantaged.	  Accordingly,	  it	  will	  sometimes	  be	  permissible	  and	  even	  morally	  required	  for	  the	  state	  to	  use	  coercive	  means	  to	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ensure	  that	  these	  duties	  are	  fulfilled	  and	  their	  corresponding	  rights	  protected.	  Thus,	  one	  legitimate	  rationale	  for	  intervening	  in	  the	  lives	  of	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  is	  to	  protect	  innocent	  persons,	  including	  children,	  from	  legally	  proscribed	  harmful	  immoral	  conduct.	  It	  is	  a	  requirement	  of	  social	  justice	  that	  the	  state	  play	  this	  role	  in	  the	  lives	  of	  those	  within	  the	  state’s	  territorial	  jurisdiction.	  A	  state	  that	  fails	  to	  do	  so	  in	  a	  conscientious,	  impartial,	  and	  consistent	  way	  treats	  those	  under	  its	  rule	  unjustly,	  just	  as	  it	  does	  when	  it	  fails	  to	  secure	  a	  fair	  distribution	  of	  the	  benefits	  and	  burdens	  of	  socioeconomic	  cooperation.	  When	  this	  protective	  function	  goes	  unfulfilled	  under	  unjust	  social	  conditions,	  like	  those	  that	  exist	  in	  ghetto	  neighborhoods,	  the	  state	  compounds	  the	  burdens	  on	  the	  oppressed	  and	  undermines	  its	  own	  legitimacy	  in	  their	  eyes.	  However,	  this	  raises	  the	  difficult	  question	  of	  whether	  moral	  reform	  of	  criminal	  offenders	  can	  be	  justified	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  is	  needed	  to	  protect	  third	  parties	  from	  harmful	  wrongdoing.	  So,	  for	  example,	  the	  cultural	  rehabilitation	  of	  criminals	  might	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  crime	  prevention	  measure,	  as	  an	  effort	  to	  reduce	  recidivism.	  Or,	  more	  controversially,	  moral	  reform	  could	  be	  directed	  at	  parents	  that	  have	  abused	  or	  neglected	  their	  children.	  This	  abuse	  and	  neglect	  might	  be	  attributed	  to	  suboptimal	  parenting	  styles	  acquired	  through	  intergenerational	  or	  peer	  influence.	  Perhaps	  moral	  reform	  would	  be	  justified	  in	  these	  cases,	  though	  this	  isn’t	  obvious.	  When	  the	  criminal	  justice	  system	  or	  children’s	  protective	  services	  do	  intervene	  to	  protect	  the	  rights	  of	  persons	  against	  the	  wrongful	  actions	  of	  others,	  moral	  reform	  may	  not	  be	  needed,	  advisable,	  or	  even	  permissible.	  Behavior	  modification	  without	  cultural	  rehabilitation—e.g.,	  punitive	  measures—may	  be	  all	  that	  is	  called	  for	  and	  justifiable.	  But	  I	  will	  not	  pursue	  this	  complex	  issue	  here,	  as	  it	  is	  not	  my	  principal	  focus.	  My	  concern	  in	  this	  chapter	  is	  with	  how	  some	  cultural	  patterns	  in	  ghettos	  may	  hold	  back	  the	  socioeconomic	  advance	  of	  those	  in	  their	  grip	  and	  whether	  moral	  reform	  is	  a	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legitimate	  antipoverty	  strategy.	  I	  am	  not	  addressing	  whether	  moral	  reform	  is	  an	  appropriate	  response	  to	  criminal	  deviance	  or	  parental	  maltreatment	  of	  children.	  State	  interventions	  aimed	  at	  ensuring	  that	  people	  fulfill	  their	  moral	  responsibilities	  to	  others	  have	  a	  different	  normative	  status	  from	  interventions	  aimed	  at	  ensuring	  that	  people	  do	  not	  harm	  their	  own	  interests.	  It	  is	  the	  latter	  rationale	  for	  moral	  reform	  that	  is	  the	  subject	  here.	  My	  objection	  is	  to	  moral	  reform	  whose	  objective	  is	  helping	  the	  black	  urban	  poor	  escape	  poverty.	  	  13.	  Two	  Responses	  From	  the	  Political	  Left	  Many	  on	  the	  political	  left	  are	  adamantly	  against	  state-­‐sponsored	  moral	  reform,	  especially	  in	  the	  context	  of	  societal	  injustice.	  They	  believe	  that	  government	  should	  not	  be	  in	  the	  business	  of	  structuring	  the	  intimate	  lives	  or	  moral	  consciousness	  of	  embattled	  citizens	  but	  should	  rather	  focus	  its	  efforts	  on	  protecting	  basic	  liberties,	  ensuring	  a	  fair	  distribution	  of	  resources,	  and	  maintaining	  a	  just	  opportunity	  structure.	  There	  are	  two	  important	  leftwing	  responses	  to	  the	  cultural	  divergence	  thesis,	  both	  of	  which	  deny	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  thesis	  itself.	  The	  first	  insists	  that	  the	  cultural	  lives	  of	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  do	  not	  actually	  diverge	  from	  the	  mainstream	  (Reed,	  1999:	  ch.	  6).	  These	  leftists	  point	  out	  that	  the	  attitudes	  and	  practices	  associated	  with	  the	  ghetto	  poor—laziness,	  hedonism,	  devaluation	  of	  academic	  achievement,	  materialism,	  promiscuity,	  rudeness,	  substance	  abuse,	  lack	  of	  respect	  for	  authority,	  non-­‐marital	  reproduction,	  irresponsible	  parenting,	  violence,	  and	  immorality—are	  also	  pervasive	  among	  the	  affluent	  and	  the	  vaunted	  middle	  class.	  The	  cultural	  patterns	  found	  in	  the	  ghetto	  are	  not	  specific	  to	  it	  but	  are	  part	  of	  a	  much	  broader	  cultural	  current	  within	  the	  United	  States.	  The	  difference,	  they	  maintain,	  is	  that	  the	  poor	  have	  far	  fewer	  resources	  than	  their	  more	  advantaged	  fellow	  citizens.	  This	  means	  that	  they	  are	  much	  less	  able	  to	  bear	  the	  costs	  of	  this	  lifestyle.	  Thus	  some	  of	  the	  burdens	  of	  the	  ghetto	  poor’s	  choices	  (e.g.,	  higher	  taxes,	  urban	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blight,	  school	  disruption,	  and	  crime)	  are	  shifted	  onto	  those	  with	  greater	  means.	  Many	  among	  the	  affluent	  resent	  this	  fact	  and	  adopt	  a	  punitive,	  authoritarian,	  or	  paternalistic	  response	  to	  the	  disadvantaged	  living	  in	  the	  deteriorated	  urban	  core.	  But	  this	  resentment	  is	  unwarranted,	  for	  the	  distribution	  of	  benefits	  and	  burdens	  of	  social	  life	  in	  the	  United	  States	  is	  profoundly	  unfair	  and	  thus	  the	  responsibility	  for	  these	  “negative	  externalities”	  cannot	  be	  (solely)	  placed	  on	  the	  ghetto	  poor.	  Moreover,	  targeting	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  for	  moral	  reform	  is	  hypocritical,	  as	  many	  so-­‐called	  mainstream	  Americans	  possess	  the	  same	  cultural	  traits	  they	  decry.	  	   A	  second	  response	  from	  the	  left	  is	  to	  accept	  that	  the	  culture	  of	  the	  ghetto	  diverges	  from	  the	  mainstream	  but	  to	  insist	  that	  this	  cultural	  divergence	  is	  not	  suboptimal	  (Stack,	  1974;	  Steinberg,	  2011).	  According	  to	  this	  view,	  group	  cultures	  are	  adaptive	  collective	  responses	  to	  the	  structural	  environment.	  The	  ghetto	  poor	  are	  simply	  responding	  rationally	  to	  the	  constraints	  of	  high	  ghetto	  walls—though	  perhaps	  they	  do	  not	  conceive	  of	  their	  values	  and	  practices	  in	  such	  terms—with	  the	  result	  being,	  not	  a	  suboptimal	  culture,	  but	  a	  culture	  that	  fits	  the	  external	  environment.	  This	  culture	  would	  change,	  perhaps	  swiftly,	  with	  improved	  material	  circumstances	  and	  greater	  protection	  of	  civil	  rights,	  as	  the	  formerly	  poor	  would	  rationally	  adapt	  to	  their	  better	  conditions.	  Thus,	  if	  we	  tear	  down	  these	  walls,	  that	  is,	  change	  the	  social	  structure	  to	  make	  it	  more	  just,	  we	  would	  thereby	  effect	  a	  positive	  change	  in	  the	  culture	  of	  ghettos	  without	  having	  to	  resort	  to	  moral	  reform.	  These	  two	  positions	  are	  important	  rivals	  to	  liberal	  moral	  reform.	  Though	  I	  will	  not	  assess	  them	  here,	  I	  mention	  them	  because	  they	  are	  alternatives	  worthy	  of	  serious	  consideration	  and	  because	  I	  want	  to	  distinguish	  them	  from	  the	  one	  I	  have	  been	  defending.	  I	  close,	  then,	  by	  briefly	  sketching	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  response	  to	  the	  cultural	  aspects	  of	  ghetto	  poverty,	  a	  liberal-­‐egalitarian	  response	  that	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  denying	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  suboptimal	  cultural	  divergence	  hypothesis.	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  14.	  Self-­‐Esteem,	  Self-­‐Respect,	  and	  Collective	  Resistance	  to	  Injustice	  I	  begin	  with	  the	  following	  normative	  premise.	  To	  be	  reasonably	  just,	  a	  liberal-­‐democratic,	  market-­‐based	  society	  must:	  (a)	  ensure	  that	  racial	  discrimination	  does	  not	  diminish	  persons’	  life	  chances,	  (b)	  maintain	  the	  conditions	  for	  fair	  equality	  of	  opportunity	  (i.e.,	  eliminating,	  as	  far	  as	  possible,	  the	  effects	  of	  class	  origins	  on	  individuals’	  life	  chances	  and	  labor-­‐market	  competitiveness),	  and	  (c)	  provide	  a	  guaranteed	  social	  minimum	  and	  adequate	  social	  services	  so	  that	  no	  one	  is	  forced	  to	  live	  in	  degrading	  forms	  of	  poverty.	  I	  realize	  many	  reject	  this	  liberal-­‐egalitarian	  stance.	  My	  goal	  here	  is	  to	  articulate	  an	  approach	  to	  ghetto	  poverty	  from	  a	  liberal-­‐egalitarian	  perspective,	  not	  to	  defend	  liberal-­‐egalitarian	  values.	  I	  would	  also	  insist	  that,	  as	  a	  factual	  matter,	  these	  principles	  of	  justice	  are	  not	  currently	  realized	  in	  the	  United	  States	  (Shelby,	  2007;	  2012).	  If	  these	  two	  claims	  are	  correct,	  it	  will	  almost	  certainly	  take	  a	  progressive	  social	  movement	  to	  realize	  liberal-­‐egalitarian	  ideals,	  for	  there	  is	  currently	  strong	  resistance	  (both	  from	  the	  business	  elite	  and	  the	  general	  public)	  to	  such	  reform	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  political	  will	  among	  many	  politicians.	  The	  key	  point	  I	  want	  to	  emphasize	  is	  that	  to	  build	  and	  sustain	  such	  a	  movement,	  which	  would	  require	  a	  large	  and	  diverse	  coalition,	  it	  will	  be	  necessary	  to	  enlist	  the	  active	  involvement	  of	  the	  ghetto	  poor.	  The	  effort	  to	  garner	  their	  cooperation	  faces	  a	  number	  of	  challenges,	  however.	  One	  of	  these	  challenges	  is	  brought	  into	  focus	  by	  the	  cultural	  divergence	  thesis.	  The	  thesis	  holds,	  on	  at	  least	  some	  variants,	  that	  the	  stigma,	  blight,	  segregation,	  crime,	  lack	  of	  opportunity,	  and	  material	  deprivation	  of	  ghetto	  neighborhoods	  have	  shaped	  the	  ambitions,	  values,	  practices,	  and	  identities	  of	  the	  ghetto	  poor.	  In	  particular,	  a	  salient	  cultural	  attitude	  in	  ghettos	  (though	  not	  exclusive	  to	  them)	  is	  widespread	  political	  cynicism	  or	  apathy,	  a	  general	  belief	  that	  the	  social	  system	  is	  irredeemably	  corrupt	  and	  that	  meaningful	  structural	  change	  cannot	  be	  achieved.	  This	  is	  hardly	  surprising,	  since	  a	  familiar	  response	  to	  long-­‐term,	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second-­‐class	  citizenship	  is	  an	  absence	  of	  civic	  engagement	  and	  an	  acceptance	  of	  unjust	  conditions	  as	  inevitable.	  If,	  as	  the	  cultural	  divergence	  thesis	  maintains,	  such	  attitudes	  encourage	  the	  development	  of	  corresponding	  social	  identities	  and	  forms	  of	  group-­‐based	  self-­‐esteem,	  then	  if	  a	  progressive	  movement	  is	  to	  emerge,	  it	  may	  be	  necessary	  for	  some	  of	  the	  cultural	  attitudes	  and	  practices	  of	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  to	  change	  after	  all.	  Without	  this	  change,	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  cannot	  be	  regarded	  as	  suitable	  allies	  in	  a	  collective	  fight	  for	  just	  social	  conditions.	  The	  difficulty	  is	  how	  to	  effect	  this	  cultural	  change	  without	  undermining	  the	  self-­‐esteem,	  attacking	  the	  self-­‐respect,	  or	  calling	  into	  question	  the	  dignity	  of	  those	  who	  have	  been	  most	  burdened	  by	  social	  injustices.	  Are	  their	  considerations	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  change	  in	  cultural	  ways	  that	  it	  would	  be	  reasonable	  for	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  to	  accept?	  Considerations	  that	  threaten	  their	  self-­‐respect,	  convey	  paternalistic	  sentiments,	  or	  question	  their	  dignity	  are	  not	  reasonably	  acceptable,	  for	  reasons	  I	  have	  explained.	  Moreover,	  as	  a	  practical	  matter,	  it	  might	  help	  the	  cause	  of	  social	  justice	  if	  alternative	  social	  bases	  of	  self-­‐esteem	  were	  developed	  or	  made	  available	  without	  being	  coupled	  with	  a	  moralizing	  attack	  on	  ghetto	  cultural	  patterns.	  Even	  if	  their	  resistance	  to	  cultural	  reform	  is	  not	  entirely	  reasonable,	  many	  among	  the	  segregated	  black	  urban	  poor	  will	  naturally	  reject	  any	  suggestion	  that	  their	  cultural	  ways	  are	  having	  a	  corrosive	  effect	  on	  their	  life	  chances,	  for	  some	  have	  found	  meaning,	  solace,	  and	  self-­‐worth	  in	  these	  cultural	  traits.	  In	  addition,	  as	  I	  have	  argued,	  the	  state	  lacks	  the	  moral	  standing	  to	  demand	  that	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  change	  their	  cultural	  perspective	  or	  practices,	  at	  least	  until	  it	  establishes	  a	  more	  just	  social	  scheme.	  So	  it	  falls	  to	  concerned	  private	  citizens	  and	  associations	  to	  convince	  the	  politically	  alienated	  among	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  that	  active	  political	  resistance	  to	  the	  current	  social	  arrangement	  is	  not	  futile,	  that	  organizing,	  mobilizing,	  and	  putting	  political	  pressure	  on	  government	  officials	  can	  yield	  positive	  results.	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My	  suggestion,	  then,	  is	  to	  make	  an	  appeal	  (perhaps	  indirectly)	  to	  the	  self-­‐respect	  of	  the	  ghetto	  poor.	  Since	  political	  resistance	  to	  injustice	  expresses	  and	  boosts	  self-­‐respect,	  the	  black	  urban	  poor	  have	  reasons	  of	  self-­‐respect	  to	  participate	  in	  a	  movement	  for	  social	  change.	  Those	  from	  the	  “outside”	  can	  point	  to	  these	  as	  reasons	  that	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  can	  reasonably	  accept.	  Because	  the	  injustices	  characteristic	  of	  ghettos	  are	  threats	  to	  the	  self-­‐respect	  of	  the	  black	  poor—that	  is,	  these	  injustices	  can	  potentially	  weaken	  their	  confidence	  in	  their	  equal	  moral	  worth—engaging	  in	  a	  collective	  struggle	  for	  social	  justice	  with	  others	  similarly	  committed	  can	  restore	  or	  fortify	  the	  self-­‐respect	  of	  the	  ghetto	  poor.	  In	  addition,	  maintaining	  a	  robust	  sense	  of	  self-­‐respect	  in	  the	  face	  of	  injustice	  can	  enhance	  self-­‐esteem.	  Persons	  can	  increase	  their	  moral	  pride	  by	  successfully	  protecting	  themselves	  against	  threats	  to	  their	  self-­‐respect.	  They	  can	  do	  this,	  not	  only	  through	  defiance	  of	  conventional	  authority	  and	  transgressing	  mainstream	  norms,	  but	  by	  protesting	  wrongs	  perpetrated	  against	  them,	  preventing	  others	  from	  violating	  their	  rights,	  or	  criticizing	  the	  beliefs	  and	  values	  that	  are	  used	  to	  justify	  their	  suffering	  and	  disadvantage.	  Efforts	  to	  change	  the	  basic	  structure	  of	  U.S.	  society	  should	  include	  the	  ghetto	  poor,	  not	  just	  as	  potential	  beneficiaries	  of	  such	  efforts,	  but	  as	  potential	  allies.	  There	  are	  already	  grassroots	  organizations	  and	  activists	  working	  to	  empower	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  and	  to	  increase	  their	  political	  participation.	  These	  efforts	  should	  be	  supported,	  joined,	  extended,	  and	  emulated.	  Not	  only	  could	  this	  dramatically	  increase	  the	  numbers	  of	  those	  pushing	  for	  social	  reform,	  but	  it	  might	  also	  help	  to	  sustain	  or	  create	  alternative	  sources	  of	  self-­‐esteem	  for	  those	  attracted	  to	  suboptimal	  cultural	  values	  and	  practices.	  Many	  could	  find	  self-­‐worth,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  moral	  pride,	  in	  working	  together	  with	  others	  to	  bring	  about	  just	  social	  conditions.	  But	  for	  this	  to	  occur	  on	  a	  large	  scale,	  forms	  of	  political	  solidarity	  that	  foster	  a	  commitment	  to	  the	  values	  of	  justice	  and	  mutual	  respect	  would	  need	  to	  be	  strengthened.	  Consequently,	  each	  member	  of	  these	  political	  associations	  could	  have	  their	  activities	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affirmed	  by	  the	  other	  members,	  thereby	  buttressing	  individual	  and	  collective	  self-­‐efficacy.	  Provided	  these	  alliances	  produced	  some	  concrete	  political	  victories	  and	  realistic	  hope	  for	  further	  gains,	  the	  result	  might	  well	  be	  the	  creation	  of	  more	  constructive	  social	  bases	  of	  self-­‐esteem	  than	  those	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  sometimes	  embrace	  today.	  Those	  who	  want	  to	  act	  in	  solidarity	  with	  the	  ghetto	  poor	  can	  therefore	  legitimately	  encourage	  them	  to	  find	  self-­‐esteem	  in	  the	  joint	  pursuit	  of	  justice.14	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